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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine waking up to this headline: "Major American Corporation
Seeks Bankruptcy1 Protection."2 Amid concern over lost jobs,3 reduced

1. Throughout this Note, references to bankruptcy, unless otherwise indicated, refer to
reorganizations under Chapter 11. The principle goal of a Chapter 11 reorganization is to preserve
the business as a going concern, balancing the claims of creditors against the value of preserving
the business; a Chapter 7 liquidation, in contrast, usually involves closing a business and selling
all of its assets (often at a lower price than the assets would have commanded if the business was
still a going concern). Compare 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1100.01 (15th ed. rev. 2006)
(discussing the general principles of Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases and the policies underlying
Chapter 11), with 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 700.01 (15th ed. rev. 2006) (discussing generally
Chapter 7 liquidation).
2. This hypothetical headline is not patterned on an actual case, but many large American
corporations have entered bankruptcy since 2004. See generally Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, FinancialCharacteristicsofBusinesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499 (1999)
(providing a detailed analysis of the demographics of businesses that file for bankruptcy). While
a large corporate bankruptcy is relatively rare and usually makes headline news, tens of thousands
of smaller businesses seek bankruptcy protection every year. See American Bankruptcy Institute,
Annual Business and Non-business Filings by Year (1980-2005), available at
http://www.abiworld.org/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm?ContentID=-l 7627 (stating that
34,317 business bankruptcy cases were filed in 2004).
3. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Searching for Reorganization
Realities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257, 1277-78 (1994) (discussing the effects of bankruptcy on
employment). Although bankruptcy threatens some workers with lost employment, one goal of the
present system is to preserve at least some jobs through reorganization under Chapter 11. See
Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on OptimalBankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1,27-28 (describing the impact of bankruptcy on communities and highlighting Chapter 11 's
emphasis on preserving jobs).
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benefits for current employees,4 dramatic changes in stock prices,5
protracted litigation, 6 enormous losses for creditors,7 and the displacement
of current owners of the business,8 two nagging questions remain: First,
what will happen to the retirees who depend on the corporation for pension
benefits, and second, will current employees realize the retirement benefits
promised to them? The answer to both questions is that the federal
government guarantees these pension plans 9 through the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), ° enabling both retired and current workers

4. See generally Donald C. Dowling, Jr., The Intersection Between US. Bankruptcy and
Employment Law, 10 LAB. LAW. 57, 57-66 (1994) (discussing workers' rights under collective
bargaining agreements in bankruptcy).
5. See generally Robert M. Lawless et al., Industry-Wide Effects of CorporateBankruptcy
Filings, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 293, 297-311 (1996) (analyzing three theories concerning the effects
of bankruptcy filings on stock prices).
6. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy andRiskAllocation,77 CoRNELLL. REv. 439,473
(1992) ("[H]owever one characterizes the costs of bankruptcy and the protracted negotiation and
litigation it encourages, the costs are real and borne by the claimants collectively.").
7. General unsecured creditors seldom receive full payment of their claims. See generally
Douglas Baird et al., The Dynamics ofLarge and Small Chapter 11 Cases:An EmpiricalStudy
(2005), available at http://faculty.gsm.ucdavis.edu/-nzhu/papers/priority.pdf (finding that
unsecured creditors of bankrupt businesses with more than $5 million in assets usually receive half
of the money they are owed). In some cases, creditors receive much less for their claims. In the
MCI bankruptcy, for example, most creditors were to receive thirty-six cents on the dollar. See
Almar Latour & Shawn Young, MCI ClearsHurdle Towards Emergingfrom Bankruptcy, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 10, 2003, at A3. In the Enron case, the reorganization plan called for general unsecured
creditors to receive 16.6 cents on the dollar. See Enron Corp.: Creditors' Target Recovery Rate
Rises in ReorganizationPlan,WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2003, at B4.
8. In a Chapter 11 case, the absolute priority rule requires a reorganization plan confirmed
over the objection of a class of unsecured creditors to leave the pre-bankruptcy equity holders with
nothing. See 11 IU.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2006). See also In re Wabash Valley Power
Ass'n, 72 F.3d 1305, 1313 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[I]n the face of the refusal of an unsecured creditor to
accept [a reorganization plan] (a 'cramdown'), the holder of any claim or interest junior to that of
the dissenter may not 'receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest
any property.' (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii))); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS
OF BANKRUPTCY 66 (4th ed. 2006) (suggesting that the absolute priority rule "animates the law of
corporate reorganizations"). The exception to the absolute priority rule is the new value corollary.
See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 458
(1999) (holding that old equity may retain some ownership in a reorganized entity if old equity
provides new value and subjects the equity interest to an auction or some other form of free market
valuation). In a Chapter 7 case, the estate is liquidated and pre-bankruptcy owners also typically
receive nothing. See Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter11 Reorganizations:Reducing
Costs, Improving Results, 73 B.U. L. REv. 581, 598 (1993).
9. For purposes of this Note, the terms "pension plan," "pension fund," and "plan" are used
interchangeably to refer to Defined Benefit Pension Plans (DBPPs), as defined by 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1002(2)(A), (35) (West 2006).
10. The PBGC is established and governed by 29 U.S.C.A. § 1301 etseq. See also infra Part
II.A (outlining the guarantees provided by the PBGC and explaining the pension plan termination
process).
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to receive at least some of the support that they expect." While those
protected by the PBGC are guaranteed at least partial payment of their
pensions, 12 the PBGC is left with an inadequately funded pension plan and
has to acquire assets to satisfy the guaranteed portion of the pensions for
which it assumes responsibility. 3 To remain solvent, the PBGC must
either obtain funds from the bankrupt business 4 or rely on a taxpayerfinanced bailout of the plan.' 5 The former option is unlikely to completely

11. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1322(a)-(b) (West 2006) (limiting the benefits paid to participants in
terminated pension plans). In some cases, this statutory limit on benefits paid by the PBGC operates
quite harshly. See, e.g., PBGC Reform: Mending the Pension Safety Net: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Retirement Security and Aging of the S. Comm. on Health,Education, Labor, and
Pensions,109th Cong. 4 (2005) [hereinafter SenateHearing](statement of Bradley Belt, Executive
Director, PBGC) (recalling that a Bethlehem Steel worker who retired after thirty years received
$3,641 per month as a pension prior to plan termination and only $1,192 per month after the PBGC
assumed control over the plan).
12. See supra note 11. For 2006, the maximum monthly benefit for a 65-year-old covered by
the PBGC electing a life annuity is $3,971.59 per month. PBGC, PBGC Maximum Monthly
Guaranteesfor Plans Terminating in 2006, http://pbgc.gov/workers-retirees/find-your-pensionplan/content/page789.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2006). The maximum benefit for a 65-year-old
electing a joint annuity with a 50% survivor annuity is $3,574.43 per month. Id. The applicable
maximum benefit is calculated based, in part, on the year a plan ends. See id.
13. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1344(c) (West 2006) (requiring the PBGC to cover the losses of
underfunded pension plans).
14. See infra Part II.B. Butsee Mary Williams Walsh, PensionBattle May EntangleMogul's
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2006, at Al (detailing the PBGC's attempts to recover assets from a
former corporate raider who pillaged Ohio steelworker pension funds).
15. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1305(c) (West 2006) ("The corporation is authorized to issue to the
Secretary of the Treasury notes or other such obligations in an aggregate amount of not to exceed
$100,000,000, in such forms and denominations, bearing such maturities, and subject to such terms
and conditions as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury."). See also id. § 1302 (g)(2)
("The receipts and disbursements of the corporation in the discharge of its functions shall be
included in the totals of the budget of the United States Government. The United States is not liable
for any obligation or liability incurred by the corporation."); Senate Hearing,supranote 11, at 1
(statement of Sen. Mike DeWine) (dismissing the possibility of a "taxpayer bailout" ofthe PBGC);
ProtectingPensions and Ensuring the Solvency of PBGC: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
GovernmentManagement, Finance,andAccountabilityof the H. Comm. on GovernmentReform,
109th Cong. 94 (2005) [hereinafter House Hearing] (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller
General, U.S. Government Accountability Office) (observing that while a government bailout of
the PBGC might be politically popular, "technically the PBGC is not backed by the full faith and
credit of the U.S. Government"); Mark Daniels, Pensionsin Peril:Single Employer PensionPlan
Terminations in the Context of CorporateBankruptcies, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 25, 35-36 (1991)
(observing that the savings and loan bailout may have foreshadowed the potential cost of a
government bailout of the PBGC); Jill L. Uylaki, Note, PromisesMade, PromisesBroken: Securing
Defined Benefit Pension PlanIncome in the Wake of Employer Bankruptcy: Should We Rethink
Priority Status for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation?,6 ELDER L.J. 77, 88 (1998)
("Unlike the archetypal federal agency, the [PBGC] receives no funding from general tax revenues.
As a result, the taxpayer need not lament that the PBGC will dip into taxpayer coffers in order to
resuscitate failed pension plans."). The PBGC invests the premiums it collects from plan sponsors
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss5/4
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cover the shortfall for an obvious reason-the insolvent company lacked
the resources to meet its obligations under the plan, which partly drove the
decision to seek bankruptcy protection. As for the latter source of funding,
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)"6 does not require
Congress to bail out the PBGC. 17 In short, current and future retirees could
be left with only a hollow guarantee that their needs will be met.' 8
While the PBGC is currently able to withstand the impact of some large
plan terminations, the increasing frequency of distressed plan terminations
threatens the overall solvency of the program. First, an increasing number
of corporations are underfunding their pension plans.' 9 Second, as
companies phase out or terminate traditional defined benefit pension plans
and replace them with employee or employer funded 401 (k) programs, the
pool of companies paying premiums to the PBGC to insure their defined
benefit plans decreases, affecting the overall fiscal viability of the PBGC.2 °
Congress has not neglected the concerns of current and future retirees.
While the future of Social Security has dominated the political landscape, 2 '

to cover underfunded plans for which it assumes liability. See infra note 153. It is only when these
reserves are exhausted that the PBGC would be forced to turn to Congress for additional funding.
16. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 10011461 (West 2006)).
17. See supra note 15.
18. See infra Part II.C (describing the precarious state of the American pension system).
19. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (discussing the funding status of PBGC
guaranteed pension plans).
20. Employers pay premiums based on the number of employees who participate in DBPPs.
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1306(a)(3)(A)(I) (West 2006). When an employer terminates a plan, it no longer
pays premiums to the PBGC. See infranote 37 and accompanying text. When an employer freezes
a plan, it continues to pay premiums for workers who are members of the plan, but because new
workers are not enrolled in frozen plans, over the long term, frozen plans decrease the total
premium base supporting the PBGC. See PBGC, AN ANALYSIS OF FROZEN DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS
13 (Dec. 19, 2005), availableat http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/frozenplans.doc.
21. President Bush placed Social Security reform atop his legislative agenda for 2005. See George
W. Bush, State of the Union Address, Feb. 2,2005, availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2005/02/20050202-1 l.html. Despite a campaign-style tour of the United States and a
significant investment of political capital, Bush was unable to enact any reforms. See David Brooks,
A Requiemfor Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2005, at A25 (lamenting President Bush's failure to
attract support for Social Security reform within a sharply-divided Congress). Division within the
Republican Party over the appropriate way to reform Social Security, see David S. Broder, Social
Security's CapitolDivide, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2005, at B07, and Democratic opposition to any
form of account privatization were the major obstacles to reform. See WASH. POST, President's
Plan 'Like Social Security Roulette,' Feb. 3, 2005, at A16 (printing "[elxcerpts from the
Democratic response to President Bush's [2005] State of the Union address"). Further discussion
of Social Security Reform is beyond the scope of this Note. Scholarly commentary, however, in
this area is quite diverse and reflects the views of both sides of the political spectrum. Compare
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR's UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE

NEED ITMORE THAN EVER 51 (2004) (listing Social Security as one of the cornerstones of President
Roosevelt's "Second Bill of Rights"), with Michael Tanner, The 6.2 PercentSolution: A Planfor
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lawmakers have also pursued strategies to secure the future solvency of the
PBGC.22 These reforms, however, have neglected the PBGC's position in
bankruptcy. When a distressed pension plan is terminated in bankruptcy,
the bankruptcy court is given latitude under the Bankruptcy Code to value
the claim of the PBGC.23 Although the 109th Congress adopted sweeping
changes to the Bankruptcy Code,24 there has been no legislative attempt to
remedy this complex valuation problem.
Absent legislative direction, the federal courts have addressed these
uncertainties under ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code.25 Bankruptcy courts
have tremendous discretion to determine the allowed amount of creditors'
claims.26 These valuation decisions can have significant impact. Presently,
the only circuit court decisions considering the valuation of PBGC claims
in bankruptcy have adopted the "prudent investor" method.27 This method
severely restricts the PBGC's ability to cover the obligations of terminated
plans.2 There is no consensus, however, throughout the federal judiciary
as to the appropriate valuation method. In one published decision, a
bankruptcy court applied the PBGC's own valuation regulation, a different
valuation method that may ultimately allow the PBGC to recover
significantly more over the course of a debtor's reorganization.29
Despite this impending crisis,3" there has been little scholarly attention

Reforming Social Security, SOCIAL SECURITY PAPER No. 32, 1 (Feb. 17, 2004), available at
http://www.socialsecurity.org/pubs/ssps/ssp32.pdf (arguing that individuals should be permitted
to privately invest half of their payroll taxes).
22. See infra Part V.A (summarizing recent legislative reforms).
23. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
24. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified throughout 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1532 (West 2006)). See
generally In re Kaplan, 331 B.R. 483, 484 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005) ("After reading the several
hundred pages of text in the [2005 amendments], one conclusion is inescapable. The new law is not
a model of clarity. Implementing the changes will present ... daunting challenge[s] ....
);
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS:

TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 112-281 (5th ed. 2006) [hereinafter WARREN & WESTBROOK,
DEBTORS & CREDITORS] (explaining the most important changes in consumer bankruptcy law

resulting from the 2005 amendments). For a discussion of the major changes in the Bankruptcy
Code relating to commercial bankruptcies, see Michael P. Richman & Craig E. Reimer, Bankruptcy
Update: Congress Overhauls the Nation's Bankruptcy Laws-Impact on Commercial Cases, 59
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 388, 389-96 (2005).

25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
28. See infra Part III.A.
29. See In re US Airways Group, Inc., 303 B.R. 784,798 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003). This case
is discussed at length in Part III.B.
30. Although the word "crisis" rings with the sound ofpolitically-charged rhetoric, the threats
to the American pension system are real. See Kathleen H. Czarney, The Future of Americans'
Pensions: Revamping Pension Plan Asset Allocation to Combat the Pension Benefit Guaranty

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss5/4

6

Rains: Searching
for Fairness
in All IN
the
Places:
Valuing the Pensi
SEARCHING
FOR FAIRNESS
ALLWrong
THE WRONG
PLACES

1113

paid to the position of the PBGC in bankruptcy. 3 1This Note attempts to fill
the void. Accordingly, this Note argues that Congress should legislatively
adopt the valuation method promulgated by the PBGC in order to
substantially increase the PBGC's recovery when it proceeds with claims
against corporations that terminate their pension plans in bankruptcy. The
focus of this Note is on the valuation of the PBGC's unsecured claim, but
in order to provide a proper foundation for the comparison of the two
competing valuation methods, it is necessary to examine the background
against which the PBGC's claim arises. To provide this context, Part II of
this Note describes the relevant ERISA and Bankruptcy Code provisions,
as well as the fragile state of the pension system in the United States. Part
11- details the competing methods presently employed by bankruptcy
courts to value PBGC claims. Part IV assesses the strengths and
weaknesses of these valuation methods. Part V analyzes recently enacted
and proposed legislative reforms and illustrates the undesirability of
addressing the problems identified by this Note through these initiatives.
Additionally, Part V includes a proposal to amend the Bankruptcy Code
to require bankruptcy courts to apply the PBGC's valuation regulation to
Corporation'sDeficit, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 153, 178-79 (2004) (noting that the PBGC faces a
"difficult task" in meeting its obligations to guarantee terminated pension plans). But see Senate
Hearing,supranote 11, at 3 (statement of Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski) ("[T]he funding of the PBGC
is not a crisis but a real problem .. "); Senate Hearing,supra note 11, at 39 (statement of Alan
Reuther, Legislative Director, United Auto Workers) (arguing that the PBGC is not facing a
"'crisis' because it can pay benefits to its obligees "for many years to come").
31. For example, a relatively recent textbook addressing pension plan terminations provides
only a cursory discussion of the valuation of the PBGC's claims in bankruptcy. See E. THOMAS
VEAL & EDWARD R. MACKIEWiCZ, PENSION PLAN TERMINATIONS 254 (2d ed. 1998) ("This book
does not address the termination of underfunded plans in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding .... Nevertheless, bankruptcy court decisions have had such a significant impact on
the treatment of the PBGC's claims in bankruptcy that a brief discussion of the issue is
warranted."). Scholarlyjournals have not done much better. See, e.g., Daniels, supranote 15, at 9293 (discussing the application of the prudent investor rate in the LTV Steel bankruptcy); Daniel
Keating, Chapter11 'sNew Ten-Ton Monster: The PBGC andBankruptcy, 77 MINN. L. REv. 803,
818-21 (1993) (emphasizing the difficulty of accurately determining the present value of the
PBGC's unsecured claim but failing to suggest a solution to the problem); Nicholas J. Brannick,
Note, At the Crossroadsof Three Codes: How Employers are Using ERISA, the Tax Code, and
Bankruptcy to Evade Their Pension Obligations,65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1577, 1610 (2004) (dedicating
two sentences and three footnotes to the valuation of PBGC unsecured claims). Practitioners,
however, are acutely aware of the significance attached to selecting one valuation method over
another. In a column published after the US Airways case, discussed infra Part III.B, one lawyer
observed, "At first glance, this dispute sounds like an arcane dispute .... But as the numbers...
make clear, this is a real issue, with a real, substantive effect on the unsecured creditors generally."
Debra A. Riley, Last in Line: The QuestionableFuture of the Prudent-InvestorRate: Will ERISA
Claims Dilute-Further-theDividends for Trade Creditors?, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 66
(2004). The state of the pension system has also raised eyebrows among less conventional
commentators. See, e.g., GEORGE CARIjN, LIFE IS WORTH LOSING (Home Box Office 2005)
(expressing his lack of confidence in corporate America's largesse when it comes to pensions).
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the PBGC's general unsecured claims for pension liability. Legislative
adoption of this valuation regulation comports with the objectives of the
bankruptcy system and also strengthens the pension guaranty system.
II. TWO LAWS PASSING IN THE NIGHT:

ERISA AND THE

BANKRUPTCY CODE

To fully understand the problems associated with valuing the unsecured
bankruptcy claim of the PBGC, it is necessary to appreciate the basic
structure and operation of the PBGC, the process through which pension
plans are terminated, and the fundamentals of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
case. The interaction between these complex bodies of law gives rise to
unique problems and negatively impacts the overall health of the pension
system in the United States.
A. The PBGC UnderERISA
Incorporated following the passage of ERISA,32 the PBGC insures
defined benefit pension plans (DBPPs) by providing guaranteed benefits
to workers enrolled in pension plans in the event that a plan sponsor is
unable to satisfy its obligations under a plan.33 The United States
government wholly owns the PBGC,34 and it collects premiums from plan

32. The PBGC was created by ERISA in 1974. Bradley D. Belt, Welcome to PBGC,
http://pbgc.gov/workers-retirees/header-footer-general/content/pagel3258.html (last visited Sept.
3, 2006). The PBGC currently provides pension benefits to approximately 1.3 million current and
future workers. See id.
33. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(35) (West 2006) (defining "'defined benefit plan"'). Essentially,
these plans provide a guaranteed future payment to plan participants. See id. The PBGC does not
insure defined contribution plans because employers are obligated to make contributions to these
plans as they become due and these plans do not guarantee a fixed future benefit to beneficiaries
of these plans. See id. § 1002(34). For a detailed discussion of the differences between defined
benefit and defined contribution plans, see LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF
EMPLOYEE PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS 30-42 (2004); FELIX POMERANZ ET AL., PENSIONS:
AN ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT GUIDE 5-7 (1976). This Note takes no position on the merits
of DBPPs vis-i-vis defined contribution plans, except to note that as fewer employers offer DBPPs,
the premium base of the PBGC decreases, affecting the corporation's solvency. See supranote 20
and accompanying text. Some economists, however, point out that DBPPs have significant positive
economic effects, including increased worker productivity, lowerjob turnover (because employees
have an incentive to remain with an employer to maximize benefits under the DBPP), and
"presumably enable [employers] to conduct on-the-job training and still recapture [their] investment
in... workers." See William G. Gale et al., Introduction, in THE EVOLVING PENSION SYSTEM:
TRENDS, EFFECTS, AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 5-6 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2005).
Accordingly, a decline in the availability of DBPPs may precipitate future economic downturns.
34. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1302 (West 2006) (outlining the organization and goals of the PBGC).
The Secretaries of the Labor, Commerce, and Treasury Departments are all directors of the PBGC.
Id. § 1302(d).
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sponsors in amounts set by Congress.35 The PBGC assumes liability for
guaranteed pensions3 6 when a plan sponsor initiates "distress" voluntar
the plan.'.
37
termination proceedings or the PBGC involuntarily terminates
Under both forms of termination, the PBGC assumes control over all plan
assets.39 The sponsor of the terminated plan is liable to the PBGC for the
amount that the plan is underfunded.' To secure its claim, the PBGC is
entitled to perfect a lien against the plan sponsor and its control group to
the extent of the funding shortfall.4 The PBGC, however, must still pay
plan beneficiaries the statutorily capped pension benefits4 2 to which they

are entitled, even if the PBGC cannot fully recover the underfunded
liability from the plan sponsor.43 The PBGC covers any shortfall in plan
assets with the invested premiums that it collects from employers
sponsoring DBPPs.4

35. See id. § 1306. The premium per participant per year for single employer plans was
previously $19, however Congress recently increased this premium to $30. See infra note 198 and
accompanying text.
36. The PBGC guarantees both single-employer and multi-employer pension plans. See 29
U.S.C.A. § 1322 (West 2006); see also id. §§ 1002(41), 1002(37) (defining single- and multiemployer plans). The difference between these plans is self-evident. Single-employer plans are
established and funded by a single employer, whereas multi-employer plans are funded by more
than one employer and are typically the result of collective bargaining agreements. See id.
37. An employer may voluntarily terminate a pension plan if it can establish that it is
financially distressed. See id. § 1341(c). An employer is "distressed" if it (1) is in the process of
being liquidated; (2) is reorganizing under Chapter 11 and must terminate the plan in order to
successfully reorganize; (3) is on the verge of going out of business unless the plan is terminated;
or (4) is able to show that the plan has become unduly burdensome as a result of a declining
workforce. See id.§ 1341 (c)(2)(B). An employer may also terminate single-employer pension plans
that are fully funded by purchasing irrevocable commitments to cover its obligations under a plan.
See id. § 1341(b)(3)(A).
38. See id. § 1342. The PBGC may involuntarily terminate pension plans under the following
conditions: (1) the plan fails to meet "the minimum funding standard required under" the I.R.C.;
(2) "the plan will be unable to pay benefits when due"; (3) the plan sponsor makes a distribution
to a "substantial owner" of the business, leaving insufficient assets to provide plan participants their
benefits; or (4) "the possible long-run loss of the corporation with respect to the plan may
reasonably be expected to increase unreasonably if the plan is not terminated." See id. § 1342(a);
§ 1343(c)(7); see also id. § 1322(b)(5)(A) (defining "substantial owner"). The PBGC may
involuntarily terminate pension plans even if doing so would run afoul of the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement. See id. § 1341(a)(3); 29 C.F.R. § 4041.7(c) (2006).
39. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1342(a)(4) (West 2006) (authorizing the PBGC to "pool assets of
terminated plans").
40. See id. § 1362(b)(2)(A).
41. Id. § 1368(a) cf infra Part II.B (describing the weakened position of the PBGC when
plans are terminated in bankruptcy).
42. See supra note 12 (listing the statutory maximum pension payments).
43. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1344(c) (West 2006) ("Any... decrease in the value of assets of a
single-employer plan . . . after the .

.

. plan is terminated shall be .

.

. suffered by .

.

. the

corporation.").
44. See PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2005), available at
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B. The PBGCas UnsecuredCreditor:Enter the Bankruptcy Code
Just as bankruptcy courts became the preferred fora for discarding
labor agreements in the 1980s,45 in the last decade many corporations
unable to meet their obligations under pension plans have turned to
bankruptcy courts for relief.4 The Bankruptcy Code contains two
provisions that facilitate the termination of pension plans. First, the
automatic stay4 7 that arises when a debtor files for bankruptcy48 prevents
the PBGC from attempting to collect assets from the debtor to cover the
funding shortfall.49 The automatic stay also prevents the PBGC from
perfecting the lien it would normally have against the assets of a plan
sponsor with an underfunded pension plan.5 ° Second, the Bankruptcy Code

http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/05annrpt.pdf
45. See generally David L. Gregory, Labor ContractRejection in Bankruptcy: The Supreme
Court'sAttack on Labor in NLRB v. Bildisco, 25 B.C. L. REV. 539 (1984) (discussing the rejection
ofcollective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy and the legal justifications under the Bankruptcy
Code for doing so); Athanassios Papaioannou, The Duty to Bargainand Rejection of Collective
Agreements UnderSection 1113 by aBankruptAirline:Trying to ReconcileR.L.A. with Bankruptcy
Code, 18 TRANSP. L.J. 219, 220-21 (1990) (describing the termination of collective bargaining
agreements by airlines in bankruptcy); JeffreyD. Berman, Note, Rejection of CollectiveBargaining
Agreements Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 71 VA. L. REV. 983 (1985) (discussing
the effect of the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code and the effect of the amendments on
collective bargaining agreements).
46. The most striking examples of employers shedding pension plans in bankruptcy are in
the American steel industry. For a discussion of several cases involving steel industry bankruptcies,
see infra Part III.A. Many airlines have recently or are currently in the process of terminating their
pension plans in bankruptcy. See Senate Hearing,supra note 11, at 5 (statement of Bradley Belt,
Executive Director, PBGC) (noting that two of the three largest PBGC claims for underfunded
pension liability were against U.S. Airways and United Airlines). For a discussion ofU.S. Airway's
termination of its pension plan in bankruptcy, see infra Part III.B.2, and for a brief mention of the
UnitedAirlines case, see infra note 136.
47. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 2006); 3 COLLUER ON BANKRUPTCY 362.01 (15th ed. rev.
2006) ("[The automatic stay] provides for a broad stay of litigation, lien enforcement and other
actions, judicial or otherwise, that are attempts to enforce or collect prepetition claims. It also stays
a wide range of actions that would affect or interfere with property of the estate [or] property of the
debtor .... ."); see also KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 41-43 (1999) (explaining that one purpose of the automatic stay is to prevent
creditors from pursuing their own claims at the expense of other creditors, thus allowing "the
liquidation or reorganization to proceed in an orderly fashion").
48. "[A] petition [filed pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code] ... operates as a stay, applicable
to all entities .... 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (West 2006).
49. See id. § 362(a)(1) (prohibiting "the commencement ... of ajudicial, administrative, or
other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the
commencement of the case under this title"). Clearly, any attempt by the PBGC to proceed against
a debtor would fall under the § 362(a)(1) prohibition of the automatic stay. See id.
50. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1368(a) (West 2006) (granting the PBGC a lien against the plan
sponsor, up to 30% of the plan sponsor's assets, to secure liability for an underfunded plan); 11
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permits the trustee or debtor-in-possession to avoid certain statutory liens,
thus preventing the PBGC from perfecting its lien once a plan sponsor files
a bankruptcy petition.5' Without the ability to proceed against the plan
sponsors or to perfect a lien against plan sponsors' assets, the PBGC is left
with a general unsecured claim.
As a general unsecured creditor, the PBGC is at a great disadvantage.
In bankruptcy, creditors receive payment for their claims according to a
strict hierarchy.52 Within each class in this hierarchy, creditors must be
treated equally. 3 Secured creditors are paid first, up to the amount of their
secured claims.54 Then unsecured creditors eligible for priority status
receive full payment of their claims, in order of priority.55 Finally, general
unsecured creditors receive payment of their pro rata shares from the
debtor's remaining assets.56 The bankruptcy court determines the amount

U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(4)-(5) (West 2006) (prohibiting "any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien
against property of the estate" or "any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of
the case"). As Brannick noted, the combination of these two statutes presents "a
termination/liability paradox-[the PBGC's] lien cannot arise until after termination, but
termination in bankruptcy prevents perfection of the PBGC's lien." Brannick, supra note 31, at
1606.
51. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 545(2) (West 2006); Brannick, supranote 31, at 1606 (noting that the
PBGC's lien would not be "enforceable against a bona fide purchaser before the commencement
of the bankruptcy proceeding."). Thus the lien could be avoided by the trustee or debtor-inpossession.
52. See GROSS, supra note 47, at 55-59 (providing an overview of the process by which
creditors are paid in bankruptcy); WARREN & WESTBROOK, DEBTORS & CREDITORS, supranote 24,
at 655-56 (discussing the process of confirming a Chapter 11 plan and the treatment of creditors
if creditors do not accept the plan).
53. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1123(a)(4) (West 2006) (requiring that a reorganization plan "provide
the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class, unless the holder of a particular
claim or interest agrees to a less favorable treatment of such particular claim or interest").
54. See id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(11) (requiring, unless a secured creditor consents otherwise, that
a secured creditor "receive... deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such
claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest
in the estate's interest in such property"). Secured creditors are entitled to interest as well. See Till
v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 480 (2004) (holding that, in the context of Chapter 13,
bankruptcy courts should "select a[n] [interest] rate high enough to compensate the creditor for its
risk but not so high as to doom the plan"); Daniel J. Carragher, What the Supreme Court's Prime
Plus Ruling Means for Chapter 11, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26, 64-65 (2004) (noting that the
interest rate selected will vary according to the risk a secured creditor faces in Chapter 11).
55. See 11. U.S.C.A. § 507 (West 2006); infra notes 211-17 and accompanying text
(discussing the order and treatment of tax priority claims).
56. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 726 (West 2006) (outlining how the assets of an estate are distributed
to creditors); id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (requiring creditors to receive a distribution under Chapter 11
at least equal to the amount such creditor would receive under Chapter 7); GROSS, supra note 47,
at 55 ("After priority claims, unsecured creditors are paid, and thereafter, if anything is left over,
the remaining sum is remitted back to the debtor."); Randal C. Picker, Voluntary Petitionsand the
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of each unsecured creditor's allowed claim. 7 If a reorganization plan calls
for payments over a period of time, then unsecured creditors are entitled
to receive the present value of their claims. 8 To accomplish this, the
bankruptcy court selects a discount rate59 and applies it to all unsecured
claims.6" Often there are few unencumbered assets left to divide among
unsecured creditors, and in some cases there are little or no unsecured
assets available for distribution.6' Consequently, many unsecured creditors
in Chapter 11 cases receive equity in the reorganized debtor in lieu of a
cash distribution.62 However, the debtor's fragile state following a
successful reorganization frequently limits the value of the equity that
unsecured creditors hold.63 In short, the PBGC can expect little monetary
compensation when it assumes liability for pension plans terminated in
bankruptcy.

Creditor's Bargain, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 519, 529 (1992) ("In bankruptcy, general unsecured
creditors share value pro rata."); see also supra note 8 (discussing the "absolute priority rule" that
unsecured creditors must either accept the plan or receive full payment of their claims before old
equity may receive any interest in the estate).
57. Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code gives bankruptcy judges broad authority to
determine the value of claims. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(b) (West 2006); In re Lake Ridge Assocs.,
169 B.R. 576, 581 n.5 (E.D. Va. 1994) (noting that the decision of a bankruptcy judge regarding
the valuation of claims where competing expert witnesses testified were reviewed for abuse of
discretion); BAIRD, supranote 8, at 32 (recognizing the "enormous power" of bankruptcy judges).
The valuation decisions of bankruptcy judges can dramatically affect the size of creditors' claims.
For example, in the US Airways case discussed in Part III.B.2 of this Note, the difference in value
between the PBGC's claim under the two competing methods was over $1 billion. Despite the
significance of these decisions, there is little predictability in the area of claim valuation. See Keith
Sharfinan, Judicial Valuation Behavior: Some Evidence From Bankruptcy, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
387, 387-88 (2005).
58. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i) (West 2006).
59. A discount rate is "[tihe interest rate used in calculating present value." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). Present value is the measure of how much money a reorganizing
debtor would need at the moment of confirmation to pay its future liability over the course of a
reorganization plan. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS, supranote 24, at 297.
Selecting a higher discount rate reduces the present value of a liability and selecting a lower
discount rate increases the present value of a liability. For a general discussion of the concept of
discounting present value, see RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 12-14, 894-95 (4th ed. 1991).
60. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1 129(b)(2)(B)(i) (West 2006).
61. See GROSS, supra note 47, at 55.
62. See, e.g., Judge Denies Motion to Reappoint Winn-Dixie ShareholderCommittee, Feb.
9, 2006, available at http://www.wtlv.com/money/news-article.aspx?storyid=51297 (mentioning
the likely distribution of stock in the reorganized Winn-Dixie grocery chain to unsecured creditors
as payment for their claims).
63. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, CorporateGovernance in the
BankruptcyReorganizationof Large,Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 687-88
& n.67 (1993) (noting that many creditors who receive equity distributions following plan
confirmation "'dump[]"' the stock, driving down already low stock prices).
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In a typical Chapter 11 bankruptcy, what little the PBGC is eligible to
recover is offered through a reorganization plan. To successfully
reorganize, a debtor or some other interested part M must propose a plan
to pay the debtor's creditors according to the hierarchy prescribed by the
Bankruptcy Code, while simultaneously preserving the debtor's business.65
Keeping the debtor in business not only satisfies the public policy goals of
the bankruptcy system (particularly the preservation of jobs and vital
industries),66 but it also benefits unsecured creditors whose only recovery
is often equity in the reorganized entity.67 To confirm a Chapter 11 plan,
the debtor must satisfy numerous statutory requirements. 68 The central, and
often most difficult requirement, is the acceptance of the plan by
creditors.69 Only plans that win statutory majorities within each class of
creditors (or alternatively employ the "cramdown" provision appropriate
for a particular class of creditors) can be confirmed.70
Within this complicated environment, the PBGC must walk a careful
line. If its claim is so large that other unsecured creditors receive very
little, then the chances of confirmation diminish. Everybody loses if the
debtor's case is eventually converted to Chapter 7 for liquidation. On the
other hand, if the PBGC receives little value for its claim, then the
solvency of the pension guaranty system is threatened. The delicate
balance required to resolve this difficult situation highlights the
importance of selecting a sound valuation method for the PBGC's claims.

64. There is a 120-day exclusivity period during which only the debtor may file a plan for
reorganization. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1121(b) (West 2006). Any party in interest, however, may file
a motion with the bankruptcy court to increase or decrease the amount of time in the exclusivity
period. See id. § 1121 (d). After the exclusivity period ends, any party in interest may propose and
seek confirmation of a plan. See id. § 1121(c).
65. See id. § 1123 (outlining the required contents of a reorganization plan); id. § 1129(a)
(providing that the bankruptcy court must make findings supporting sixteen requirements in order
to confirm a reorganization plan).
66. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text (discussing the policy considerations
underlying bankruptcy).
67. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. But see Paul B. Lewis, Bankruptcy
Thermodynamics, 50 FLA. L. REv. 329,332-33 (1998) (criticizing the imperative imposed by many
courts and debtors to avoid the 'doomsday' of liquidation as a waste of creditors' resources).
68. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a) (West 2006).
69. See id. § 1129(a)(8); supranote 8 (discussing the absolute priority rule and "cramdown").
Satisfying the requirements for "cramdown" only becomes necessary when a class of creditors does
not accept the plan. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b) (West 2006).
70. See id. § 1122 (providing rules for the assignment of creditors to classes); id. § 1126(c)
(indicating that a class of creditors accepts a plan if"at least two-thirds in amount and more than
one-half in number" accept the plan).
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C. The Impact: PensionsImperiled
Driven in part by the favorable conditions for terminating pension plans
in bankruptcy,7 ' the landscape of the American pension system is
experiencing dramatic changes. Many employers are freezing or
terminating their DBPPs and replacing the plans with defined contribution
plans.7 Furthermore, even plan sponsors that have not taken steps to
eliminate or freeze their plans are in a precarious situation. In its 2005
Performance and Accountability Report,7 3 the PBGC determined that
"underfunded pension plans had $786.8 billion in assets [but] ... more
than $1.14 trillion in liabilities," a shortfall of $353.7 billion.74 These plans
provide benefits to approximately fifteen million workers and retirees.75
The PBGC may ultimately avoid liability for some of these underfunded
plans if the plan sponsors are able to fund these deficits.76 The PBGC's
solvency, however, is in jeopardy. Due in large part to a wave of industry-

71. For example, Delta Airlines is presently considering terminating its pilots' pension plan
in bankruptcy, shifting responsibility to the PBGC for more than 6,000 pilots' pensions. See Evan
Perez, DeltaLikely to Cut Pilots' Pension Plan,WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2006, at A3.
72. As of 2004, 32,000 employers offered DBPPs, down from more than 100,000 in 1985.
H.R. REP. No. 109-232, pt. 1, at 269 (2005) (Minority Views). "[T]he number of active workers
covered by such plans has dropped from over 40 million to under 20 million .... Id. Anecdotal
reports regarding prominent companies illustrate this change vividly. See, e.g., Ken Belson & Matt
Richtel, Verizon to Halt Pension Money for its Managers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2005, at Al
(describing Verizon's move to shift 50,000 of its managers from DBPPs to 401 (k) plans); Michelle
Mayhard, G.M to Freeze Pension Planfor Salaried Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at C3
(discussing GM's move to freeze 42,000 salaried employees' pension plans and convert employees
hired after Jan. 1,2001 to 401 (k) plans); Mary Williams Walsh, More CompaniesEndingPromises
for Retirement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2006, at Al (listing Verizon, IBM, Motorola, and Lockheed
Martin as examples of healthy companies that have recently frozen their DBPPs and predicting that
more companies will follow their lead); Mary Williams Walsh, LB.M to Freeze PensionPlans To
Trim Costs,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,2006, at C2 (detailing the decision of IBM, the third largest pension
plan sponsor in the U.S., to freeze its DBPPs beginning in 2008 and offer 401 (k) plans thereafter).
73. PBGC, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2005 (Nov. 15,
2005), availableat http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/2005par.pdf [hereinafter PBGC, PERFORMANCE &
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT].

74. Id. at 5. This data indicates that the average plan only has 69% of the funding required
to meet its obligations. See id. at 5. Delta Airlines provides a striking example of the degree to
which plans are underfunded. According to Delta's own calculations, it only has enough assets to
cover 54% of its obligations under its pilots' pension plan. See Perez, supra note 71, at A3. The
PBGC's report may understate the magnitude of the problem, however, because only companies
with $50 million or more in underfunded pension liability must file a report with the PBGC.
75. See PBGC, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 73, at 5.
76. See House Hearing, supra note 15, at 30 (testimony of Bradley D. Belt, Executive
Director, PBGC) (noting that most companies that sponsor the plans are solvent and should be able
to meet their obligations).
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wide bankruptcies,77 the PBGC faces a funding deficit of between $23 and
$27.5 billion dollars. 7' These estimates reflect the current liability of the
PBGC for plans over which it has already assumed control and do not
include the $100 billion in liability that the PBGC predicts it will incur as
more plan sponsors terminate troubled pension plans.79 That these
insecurities are largely the result of airline and steel bankruptcies 0
highlights the importance of pension reform and demonstrates the need to
ensure the PBGC a substantial recovery during the bankruptcy and
reorganization process.8'

77. See Senate Hearing, supra note 11, at 44 (statement of Alan Reuther, Legislative
Director, United Auto Workers) ("The truth is the PBGC was never designed to handle widespread
bankruptcies and pension plan terminations across entire industries, as we have seen in steel and
are now witnessing in airlines."); House Hearing,supra note 15, at 30-31 (testimony of Bradley
D. Belt, Executive Director, PBGC) (noting that plan terminations in bankruptcy by some airlines
may force other airlines to follow suit to remain competitive, thus putting "more pressure on the
PBGC at a time when the pension insurance program can least afford it"); Amy Lassiter, Note,
Mayday, Mayday!. How the CurrentBankruptcy Code Failsto Protectthe PensionsofEmployees,
93 Ky. L.J. 939, 950 (2004) (predicting that the automobile industry will soon follow the airline
industry's move and seek termination of pension plans in bankruptcy). The problem of industrywide bankruptcies illustrates the difficulty that the PBGC has in predicting future bankruptcies. See
House Hearing,supra note 15, at 19 (prepared statement ofDavid M. Walker, Comptroller General
of the United States) (discussing the extent of the uncertainty underlying the PBGC's ability to
gauge its future liabilities because of the unpredictable nature of the economy and the
unforeseeability of some bankruptcies).
78. The PBGC calculates that its deficit as of September 30,2005, was $23.1 billion. PBGC,
PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 73, at 4. But see H.R. REP. NO. 109-232,
pt. 1, at 269 (2005) (Minority Views) (stating that the PBGC's deficit may be as high as $27.5
billion). The deficit found by the PBGC contrasts sharply with the $10 million surplus reported in
2000. HouseHearing,supra note 15, at 1 (statement of Rep. Todd R. Platts, Chairman, Subcomm.
On Gov't Management, Finance, and Accountability).
79. See H.R. REP. No. 109-232, pt. 1, at 269 (2005) (Minority Views). The companies
sponsoring the plans creating this liability are "junk-rated" in the commercial lending world. See
Senate Hearing,supra note 11, at 8 (statement of Bradley Belt, Executive Director, PBGC). The
PBGC's predictions about its future liability might understate the problem because of accounting
and reporting practices employed by plan sponsors. See Bradley D. Belt, Through the Looking
Glass: Adventures in Pension Land, Mar. 13, 2006, http://www.pbgc.gov/media/newsarchive/ExecutiveSpeech/sp 15669.html; see also infra notes 205-10 and accompanying text
(discussing the recent pension reform legislation).
80. See supra note 77.
81. Even large bankruptcy recoveries, however, may not save the PBGC. See House Hearing,
supra note 15, at 84 (statement of Doug Elliot, President, Center on Federal Financial Institutions)
("[The] PBGC would need a $78 billion infusion in today's dollars in order to avoid running out
of cash over the next 75 years assuming present law and policy."). Current reforms addressing the
PBGC's premium rates may alleviate some of this problem. See infra Part V.A (outlining present
legislative reforms).
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III. VALUING THE PBGC's UNSECURED CLAIM: COMPETING METHODS

As the cases discussed throughout this Part demonstrate, the valuation
of the PBGC's unsecured claim is a complex and contentious issue.
Although courts have considered a number of possible valuation
methods,82 courts have only used the prudent investor rate and the PBGC's
valuation regulation. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits have adopted the
prudent investor rate, 3 but no other circuits have addressed the question
of which valuation method to employ. Recently, in two airline Chapter 11
cases, bankruptcy courts have declined to follow the Sixth and Tenth
Circuits, instead applying the PBGC's valuation regulation to determine
84
the present value of the PBGC's claim for unfunded pension liability.
A. The PrudentInvestor Rate
1. The Origin of the Prudent Investor Rate
The prudent investor rate was first applied in the LTV Steel
bankruptcy. 5 LTV Steel administered several pension plans and shortly
after it filed for bankruptcy, the PBGC initiated involuntary termination
proceedings against the company for four of its pension plans.8 6 After
protracted litigation, 7 the bankruptcy court was directed by the federal
district court to determine "the specific discount rate to be applied to the
[PBGC] claims" for one of the terminated plans.88
Presented with five possible valuation methods, including both the
PBGC valuation regulation and the prudent investor rate,89 the bankruptcy
court concluded the prudent investor rate was the best approach to
"determine the present value of the [PBGC's] claim."9 ° The court defined
the prudent investor rate as "'the rate of return achievable by a reasonable,
prudent, long-term [pension fund portfolio] investor who seeks to achieve
the best long-term return on his investment consistent with preserving his
82. See infra notes 151, 154, and 161 and accompanying text (discussing three alternative
approaches in Chateaugay).
83. See infra notes 101 and 117 and accompanying text.
84. See infra note 136 (discussing the application of the PBGC valuation regulation in both
the United Airlines and US Airways Group bankruptcy proceedings).
85. In re Chateaugay Corp., 126 B.R. 165, 177 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, opinion
withdrawn 1993 WL 388809 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1993).
86. Id. at 168.
87. See id. at 168-70 (summarizing the complex maneuvering of the parties and the ruling
of the federal district court reviewing the PBGC's claims).
88. Id. at 170.
89. For a discussion of the other valuation methods, see infra Part III.C.
90. Chateaugay, 126 B.R. at 177. Ultimately, the court concluded that a prudent investor
could achieve a rate of return of 11.5%. Id.
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capital and minimizing risk."' 9 Further, the court observed that financial
analysts employ this method "every day. 92 Four assumptions underlie the
court's acceptance of this method. First, a prudent investor is experienced
and is aware of the possible returns achievable through different
securities.93 Second, a prudent investor knows the risks inherent in
alternative investments.94 Third, a prudent investor maintains a diversified
portfolio of investments,95 and finally, a prudent investor "does not
actively manage the portfolio."9 6 The court acknowledged that the
"technical specifications" of the prudent investor model were possibly
' but concluded
"open to academic dispute,"97
that the prudent investor rate
was "the most rational approach . . . [in] attempt[ing] . . .to apply a
' Following a settlement by the
theoretical model to a practical problem."98
parties, however, the decision was eventually withdrawn."
2. The Tenth Circuit's Adoption of the Prudent Investor Rate
The Tenth Circuit elevated the stature of the prudent investor rate with
its decision in In re CF & I Fabricatorsof Utah, Inc.,' ° giving this
valuation method circuit-level authority.'' Among other issues, 10 2 the

91. Id. at 175 (quoting CARMINEJ. GRiGOU, ANALYSIS OFTHE APPROPRIATE DISCOUNT RATE
FOR USE INTHE DETERMINATION OF THE PBGC CLAIM (Nov. 28, 1990)) (bracketed material in the
original).
92. Chateaugay, 126 B.R. at 175-76. The court clarified that the prudent investor was an
"'average' investor earning 'average' returns." Id. at 176.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The court's phrasing of this assumption is enigmatic. As one financial expert
explained:
Active managers try to pick attractive stocks, bonds, mutual funds, the time when
to move into or out of markets and sectors, and place bets on the future direction
of securities and markets with options, futures, and other derivatives. Their
objective is to make a profit and to beat the benchmark by which the fund is
measured against. They strive to be better than average.
Nigel Speirs, Taking the Gloves Off, FINANCiALADViSOR, availableat 2006 WLNR 4048113 (Mar.
9, 2006).
97. Chateaugay,126 B.R. at 177.
98. Id.
99. LTV Corp. v. PBGC, Nos. 89 Civ. 6012 (KTD), 90 Civ. 6048 (KTD), 1993 WL 388809
(S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1993).
100. 150 F.3d 1293 (10th Cir. 1998).
101. Id. at 1301.
102. The PBGC argued that its unsecured claim should have received tax and administrative
priority under the Bankruptcy Code. See id. at 1296-1300. The Tenth Circuit declined to afford the
PBGC's claim either form of priority. See id. For a discussion of the merits and shortcomings of
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court considered whether to employ the prudent investor rate to determine
the present value of the PBGC's unsecured claim or accept the discount
rate derived from the PBGC's valuation regulation."0 3 The facts in CF &
I were relatively straightforward. CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc. (CF &
I) offered its employees a defined benefit pension plan before its attempt
to reorganize under Chapter 11.104 As a result of the downturn in the
American steel industry, CF & I was unable to meet its funding
obligations." 5 After filing a Chapter 11 petition, CF & I failed to make any
further contributions.' 6 CF & I, however, did not voluntarily terminate its
plan.'0 7 Instead, the PBGC involuntarily terminated the plan, citing the
lack of assets in the estate.108
At a hearing to determine the amount of the PBGC's unsecured claim,
the PBGC argued that it was entitled to $222,866,000, on the basis of its
valuation regulation.109 CF & I, relying on a prudent investor rate, argued
that the PBGC's unsecured claim was valued at only $124,441,000.'"° The
court rejected the PBGC's proposed valuation method on the basis of two
legal arguments."' First, the court accepted CF & I's argument that the
PBGC valuation regulation was irrelevant in the context of bankruptcy. "2
The court disagreed with the PBGC's contention that Congress delegated
the PBGC the authority to value its unsecured claim when Congress
enacted ERISA." 3 Second, the court interpreted the general principle of
bankruptcy law that creditors holding claims of the same class should be
treated equally to mean that the PBGC valuation regulation would unfairly
advantage the PBGC's claim and thus was unacceptable.1 4 The court's

attaching priority status to PBGC unsecured claims, see infra Part V.B. 1-2.
103. CF&I, 150 F.3d at 1300.
104. See id. at 1295.
105. Id. As of the date of its Chapter 11 petition, CF & I had failed to make approximately $14
million in minimum payments into the plan. See id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1295-96 (stating that "PBGC terminated the plan and became its statutory
trustee" pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1342).
109. Id. at 1300.
110. Id.
111. See id. The court did not discuss the accuracy of the two standards as they relate to the
amount the PBGC would have to collect in order to completely fund its guarantee under the
terminated plan. Cf In re U.S. Airways Group, Inc., 303 B.R. 784, 798 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003)
(concluding that the PBGC valuation regulation accurately estimates the present value of the
PBGC's unsecured claim).
112. SeeCF&I, 150F.3dat 1301.
113. See id. at 1300-01.
114. See id. at 1301 ("[The] principle [that like claims be treated equally] would be violated
here ifPBGC's interpretation of[29 U.S.C.] § 1301 (a)(l 8) were adopted because PBGC's discount
rate would apply only to it and not any other general unsecured creditor.").
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holding resulted in a dramatically reduced recovery by the PBGC. "1 5
3. The Sixth Circuit's Adoption of the Prudent Investor Rate
In In re CSC Industries, Inc.,1 16 the Sixth Circuit followed the Tenth
Circuit's approach in CF & land approved the prudent investor rate as an
appropriate discount rate for valuing the PBGC's unsecured claim for
underfunded pension liability." 7 The debtor, Copperweld Steel Company
(CSC), failed to make minimum funding contributions for three of its
pension plans and subsequently filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition."'
The PBGC sought involuntary termination of the pension plans, but
ultimately settled with CSC and allowed CSC to voluntarily terminate the
plans." 9 Employing its own valuation regulation, the PBGC filed a proof
of claim for $49,658,702.19.121 CSC objected to the PBGC's proof of
claim, and argued that the PBGC's claim should instead be valued at
$1,822,075.19, a number arrived at by applying the prudent investor rate
to the amount of its unfunded liability.' 2 '
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decisions of the bankruptcy court and
the federal district court, and adopted the prudent investor rate as the
appropriate valuation method.' 22 The Sixth Circuit was not persuaded by
the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that the PBGC valuation regulation was
"subordinated to the Bankruptcy Code" because of language within
ERISA.1 23 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit found that the PBGC's claim
should be treated like all other unsecured claims and thus the prudent

115. See id. at 1300-01.
116. 232 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 2000).
117. See id. at 509.
118. Id. at 507.

119. Id. For a discussion ofthe differences between standard voluntary terminations, distressed
voluntary terminations, and involuntary terminations, see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying
text.

120. See CSC Indus., 232 F.3d at 507. The PBGC arrived at this number by "using an
investment return rate of 6.4% for the first 20 years and 5.75% thereafter." Id. at 507-08.
121. See id. at 508. It is not clear how CSC arrived at a number almost twenty-five times
smaller than the PBGC's estimate of CSC's unfunded pension liability. Perhaps CSC's retirement
or mortality assumptions varied dramatically from the PBGC's. The mortality and retirement
assumptions employed by the PBGC are appended to its valuation regulation. See 29 C.F.R.
§§ 4044.41, .51-.57, .71-.75 (2006). The distance between these numbers might also be explained
by the dramatic effect that even a small difference in the discount rate can have on the total amount
of a liability that extends over an extremely long period of time. See Riley, supra note 31, at 66.
122. See CSC Indus., 232 F.3d at 508-09. Both the bankruptcy court and the federal district
court employed the prudent investor rate to determine the amount of the PBGC's unsecured claim.
See id. at 508.

123. See id. at 509 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (2000)); cf. supra notes 112-13 and
accompanying text.
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investor rate applied. 124 The Sixth Circuit also concluded that the Supreme
Court's decision in Raleigh v. Illinois Department of Revenue 25 did not
26
require the application of the PBGC valuation regulation.1
B. The PBGC Valuation Regulation
1. The Regulation
The prudent investor rate employed in CF & I and CSC Industries
focuses on determining how much the PBGC would need to recover in
order to invest the assets in a diversified portfolio that would be used to
pay the plan's obligations as they become due. The PBGC's valuation
regulation, 27 however, approaches the valuation problem from another
perspective. The PBGC's regulation attempts to estimate, with as much
accuracy as possible, the amount a private annuity 128 issuer would charge
in order to assume liability for a terminated pension plan. 129 To determine
124. See CSC Indus., 232 F.3d at 509 ("[T]he PBGC should be treated like any other
unsecured creditor in the bankruptcy reorganization; therefore, the use of the 'prudent investor rate'
to value the PBGC's claim was appropriate.").
125. 530 U.S. 15 (2000). In Raleigh, the Supreme Court considered whether state tax law
controlled the allocation of the burden of proof on a tax claim in the bankruptcy context. Id. at 17.
Holding that bankruptcy did not change the burden of proof under state law, id., the Court observed
that "the validity of a claim is generally a function of underlying substantive law. Bankruptcy
courts are not authorized in the name of equity to make wholesale substitution of underlying law
controlling the validity of creditors' entitlements .... " Id. at 24-25. Scholarly analysis of the
Raleigh decision has generally focused on the decision's impact on the Erie doctrine. See, e.g.,
Thomas E. Plank, The ErieDoctrineandBankruptcy,79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 633,650-51 (2004).
Raleigh does, however, clearly stand for the proposition "that underlying substantive law governs
the establishment of a valid claim." Roger S. Cox, Bankruptcy and Creditors'Rights,54 SMU L.
REv. 1141, 1144 (2001).
126. See CSC Indus., 232 F.3d at 509. The Tenth Circuit decided CF& I before Raleigh. The
CSC Industriescourt distinguished the validity of a claim in bankruptcy from its allowability and
amount. See id. Accordingly, the court concluded that. ERISA established and controlled the
validity of the PBGC's claim, but did not bind the bankruptcy court in deciding the amount of the
claim. See id.
127. The PBGC initially promulgated its valuation regulation in 1976. See 41 Fed. Reg. 48,484
(1976). Amendments germane to this Note were adopted in 1993 and 2005. See 58 Fed. Reg.
50,812, 50,813, 50,821-30 (1993) (appending, inter alia, the 1983 GAM mortality table to the
regulation); 70 Fed. Reg. 72,205 (2005) (appending, interalia,the 1994 GAM mortality table to
the regulation). The regulation is presently codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 4044.41, .51-.57, .71-.75
(2006).
128. An annuity is "[a]n obligation to pay a stated sum.., to a stated recipient .... These
payments terminate upon the death of the designated beneficiary." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 99
(8th ed. 2004). Annuities are not insurance contracts, but most annuities are issued by insurance
companies. See generally 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:22 (3d ed. 2005).
129. See 41 Fed. Reg. 48,485 (1976) (explaining that the goal of the regulation is to arrive at
a number "in line with industry annuity prices").
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what an annuity issuer would pay to assume liability for a terminated plan,
the PBGC distributes quarterly surveys to insurance companies. 3 ° The
survey results typically demonstrate relative uniformity in pricing across
the insurance industry.' 3 ' Working "backwards" from the results of these
surveys, the PBGC then calculates a discount rate for use with its valuation
regulation.'32 The discount rate is updated monthly using a corporate bond
index rate to make adjustments as necessary.'33 The PBGC then uses the
discount rate in conjunction with actuarial mortality tables and expected
retirement tables to calculate the amount required to purchase an annuity
to cover the obligations of a terminated plan.'3 4 Taken together, the
provisions of the PBGC's valuation regulation result in a much larger
estimate of the debtor's liability under a terminated pension plan.
2. The US Airways Case: The Regulation in Action
' accepting
The first reported opinion, In re US Airways Group,Inc., "35
the PBGC's valuation regulation was announced during the course of US
' While operating in Chapter 11,
Airways' first Chapter 11 reorganization. 36

130. See In re US Airways Group, Inc., 303 B.R. 784,788 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003). The PBGC
employs a "'double-blind' process. Id. First, it sends the surveys to a life insurance trade group
that then distributes the surveys to insurance companies that sell single-premium annuities. See id.
The insurance companies are free to ignore the surveys, but the trade association usually receives
between nine and twelve responses. See id. Each response contains prices for single-premium
annuities for specific ages. See id. The trade association returns the surveys to the PBGC free of
any identifying information in a sealed envelope. See id. The PBGC, employing no specific
methodology, discards surveys that appear to be "'outliers."' Id.
131. The US Airways court provided a compelling example of the accuracy of the PBGC
survey, noting that "the reported prices for the September 2002 survey for an annuity paying $10
per month for life beginning immediately at age sixty were as follows: $1,450.91; $1,436.59;
$1,485.58; $1,465.62; $1,492.61; $1,434.60; $1,582.00; and $1,482.00." Id.
132. See id. The discount rate is derived through a multi-step process. First, the PBGC
averages the price data provided by insurance companies for single-premium annuities. See id.
Second, the PBGC calculates a range of discount rates that would yield the average prices using
its mortality assumptions and retirement assumptions. See id. Finally, the PBGC selects the
discount rate that most closely tracks the average price data from the surveys. See id. at 788-89.
133. See id. at 789.
134. See id. at 788-89. The PBGC's valuation method mirrors the actuarial assumptions used
by plan sponsors to calculate the amount that they must contribute to their plans to cover the
liabilities associated with future retirees reaching eligibility under the pensions they sponsor. See
POMERANZ ET AL., supranote 33, at 23-24; see also BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 59, at 892-93
(discussing the process of calculating the current liability of a plan sponsor under its pension plan).
135. 303 B.R. 784 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003).
136. Id. at 786. US Airways filed its first Chapter 11 petition in 2002. Id. After emerging from
Chapter 11 protection in 2003, US Airways filed bankruptcy a second time in 2004. See id. Judge
Stephen S. Mitchell authored the opinion. US Airways, 303 B.R. at 786. The bankruptcy court in
the United Airlines case also employed the PBGC's valuation regulation. See Transcript of
Proceedings before the Honorable Eugene R. Wedoff, In re UAL Corp., No. 02-B-48191, at 33

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

21

Florida Law Review,
Vol.LA58,
Iss. 5 [2006], Art. 4
FLORIDA
WREVIEW

[Vol. 58

US Airways sought approval from the bankruptcy court to terminate the
pension plan it provided for its airline pilots. 1" The court approved US
Airways' request, noting that without terminating its pilots' pension plan,
US Airways was unlikely to reorganize successfully.'38 After the pension
plan was terminated, the PBGC filed a proof of claim seeking payment for
the plan's unfunded pension liability.139 The PBGC asserted a claim of
$2,083,600,000, calculated using its valuation regulation."4 US Airways,
employing a prudent investor rate, valued the PBGC's claim at
$894,000,000. 141
The bankruptcy court declined to follow the Sixth and Tenth Circuits'
lead in applying the prudent investor rate. 142 The court arrived at this
conclusion for several reasons. First, interpreting Raleigh143 differently, the
court noted that non-bankruptcy law governs a creditor's claim.'" Thus,
though a bankruptcy court might ultimately only approve payment of
"pennies on the dollar" for the PBGC's claim, the amount of the claim
should be determined under ERISA and the PBGC's valuation
regulation. 45 Second, the court noted that bankruptcy courts are courts of
equity 46 and therefore could "'sift the circumstances surrounding any
claim to see that injustice or unfairness is not done in administration of the
bankrupt estate."",147 Accordingly, the court found no conflict between its
obligation to treat creditors of the same class equally and its decision to
apply the PBGC's valuation regulation to fix the amount of the PBGC's
claim. 48 Finally, the court disagreed with US Airways' position that the
(Dec. 16, 2005) (on file with author). Judge Wedoff, ruling from the bench, rejected the CF&I and
CSC Industries approaches in favor of the US Airways method of valuing the PBGC's claim. Id.
137. Id. at 786. The termination was a "'distress' termination. Id.
138. Id. at 787.
139. Id.
140. Id. The PBGC's actuaries used the 1983 GAM mortality table, an expected retirement
age of fifty-six, and a discount rate of 5.1% for the first twenty years and 5.25% afterwards to value
its claim. Id. The actuaries employed by US Airways actually arrived at a higher number, $2.362
billion, when they calculated the PBGC's claim using the PBGC's valuation method. Id. at 787 n.3.
141. Id. at 788-89. US Airways' actuaries used the 1994 GAM mortality table, an expected
average retirement age of sixty, and a discount rate of 8% to calculate the value of the PBGC's
claim. Id. at 788.
142. See id. at 792.
143. For a discussion of this case, see supra note 125.
144. See USAirways, 303 B.R. at 792.
145. Id. at 792-93. Compareid with the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Raleighat supra note
125 and accompanying text.
146. US Airways, 303 B.R. at 793 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240
(1934)). For a general discussion of the function of bankruptcy courts as courts of equity, see
Jeffrey Davis, EquitableLiens and Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy: Judicial Values and the
Limits of Bankruptcy DistributionPolicy, 41 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1989).
147. US Airways, 303 B.R. at 793 (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307-08 (1939)).
148. See id. at 793-94 ("So long as all claims are determined in accordance with applicable
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PBGC valuation
regulation would unjustifiably inflate the PBGC's
149
recovery.

C. Other Possibilities
Bankruptcy courts have considered other valuation methods, but these
methods have never been employed in a reported decision. In In re
Chateaugay Corp.,' 50 the PBGC argued that an appropriate valuation
method was the "risk-free rate."'' This rate is determined by looking to
the interest rate of the United States Treasury Bonds. 52 While this
approach minimizes risk by assuming a low rate of return adjusted for
inflation, "it is nonetheless
insufficient because of its [overly conservative]
53
treatment of risk."'
The PBGC has also argued that its unsecured claim should be valued
by determining what a private annuity issuer would charge to assume
liability for future pension liability. 5 4 This method closely resembles the
PBGC's valuation regulation, but is different in a crucial respect: Instead
of working backward from survey data and calculating a discount rate,' 55
this approach would apply the discount rate generally applicable to
unsecured creditors in a particular case to whatever price an annuity issuer
would charge to assume liability for a terminated plan.' 56 Employing this
valuation method poses two serious problems. First, a private annuity
issuer incorporates administrative and marketing costs into the price it
charges for an annuity.' Further, private annuity issuers also mark up
annuity prices in order to make a profit.' 58 As a result of these extra costs
and expected profit, it is impossible to calculate the actual cost of

nonbankruptcy law, there cannot be any genuine issue of disparate treatment.").
149. See id. at 794-96. The court rejected US Airways' "premise that the real loss likely to be
suffered by the PBGC is so much less than the amount calculated using the valuation regulation that
the PBGC will recover a hugely greater percentage of its loss than will other unsecured creditors."
Id.at 794.
150. Inre Chateaugay Corp., 126 B.R. 165, 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated,opinion
withdrawn 1993 WL 388809 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1993). For a discussion of the case, see supra Part
III.A.1.
151. See Chateaugay, 126 B.R. at 174.
152. See id.
153. Id.The PBGC invests the insurance premiums it receives from employers offering
defined benefit plans in Treasury Bonds. See In re US Airways Group, 303 B.R. 784, 789 n.4
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003). Presumably, however, the PBGC employs this strategy to protect the
premiums in order to ensure that it has sufficient funds to cover its liability for underfunded
pensions for which it accepts responsibility.
154. See Chateaugay, 126 B.R. at 172.
155. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
156. See Chateaugay, 126 B.R. at 172-73.
157. See id.
at 173.
158. See id.
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assuming the liability for a terminated plan. Second, annuity prices
fluctuate and there is no way to determine what an annuity would cost
without obtaining a price quote.' 59 Annuity prices also vary from company
to company, introducing additional uncertainty. 60
Finally, LTV Steel argued in Chateaugayfor a "specific risk" approach
to value the PBGC's claim.' 6 ' Essentially, this method would require the
bankruptcy court to estimate an amount "which aggregates all employee
claims on an annual basis and then uses... [a] weighted average discount
rate... [to determine] the amount of employee claims in any particular
year."' 62 Once the court arrives at these annual estimates, it would then
apply different discount rates for each year's projected liability.'63 The
Chateaugaycourt, quite correctly, dismissed this approach as extremely
unreliable and difficult to apply."6
IV. EVALUATING VALUATION METHODS: COMPETING POLICIES

Both the prudent investor rate and the PBGC's valuation regulation
share a common purpose: to estimate the present value of the PBGC's
unsecured claim against a plan sponsor with an underfunded pension
plan.'65 Despite this shared purpose, several legal and policy arguments
demonstrate that the PBGC's valuation regulation is preferable. The
PBGC's regulation strikes the best possible balance between ensuring a
large recovery for the PBGC (in order to ensure the corporation's
continued solvency) and promoting the central purpose of Chapter 11: the
confirmation of a workable reorganization plan that preserves the debtor
as a going concern.
A. The PBGC Valuation Regulation is a Permissible Valuation
Method Under the Bankruptcy Code
The principle legal objections to the PBGC's valuation regulation are
that it treats the PBGC differently than other unsecured creditors'66 and
that the regulation only applies outside of bankruptcy.'6 7 The latter
argument merits little discussion. Neither ERISA nor the PBGC's

159. See id.
160. Seeid.
161. Id. at 174.
162. Id. at 175.
163. See id. at 174-75.
164. Id. at 174.
165. Comparesupra Part III.A with supra Part III.B.
166. See, e.g., In re CSC Indus., Inc., 232 F.3d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 2000); In re CF & I
Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 150 F.3d 1293, 1301 (10th Cir. 1998).
167. See CF & I, 150 F.3d at 1300-01. But see CSC Indus., 232 F.3d at 509 (declining to
follow the Tenth Circuit's holding that the PBGC valuation regulation conflicted with provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code relating to claims valuation).
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valuation regulation contains any language restricting the use of the
regulation in bankruptcy. 168 The regulation is simply the underlying
69
substantive law that fixes the amount of the PBGC's unsecured claim.1
The issue of equal treatment of creditors, however, has created more
problems for the PBGC, as evidenced by CF & I and CSC Industries. The
problem is that the valuation regulation's discount rate is only applied to
the PBGC's claim. Superficially, this may appear to clash with the
Bankruptcy Code's prohibition against treating creditors of the same class
differently, 7 ° but there is in fact no conflict. The discount rate, along with
retirement and mortality assumptions, is used to determine the present
value of the debt owed to the PBGC.' 7' This debt is the PBGC's claim
against the debtor. Once this amount is determined, the PBGC receives the
present value of its claim in exactly the same fashion as every other
unsecured creditor. The bankruptcy court chooses a discount rate applied
' The confusion
to every unsecured creditor's claim, including the PBGC. 72
here arises because a discount rate is used to determine the initial amount
owed to the PBGC. This discount rate, however, is different than the rate
applied equally to all unsecured claims. Phrased another way, the PBGC
receives the present value of the claim that it would have had outside of
bankruptcy, just as any other unsecured creditor would.'73 Because the
PBGC's regulation does not violate the Bankruptcy Code's restriction
against favoring one creditor in a class over the others, there is no legal

168. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(30) (West 2006) ("[Regarding] 'unfunded accrued
liability' ... [,J [t]he Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe regulations."); 29 C.F.R. § 4044.41
(2006).
169. The CF & I court concluded that the language of 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) limits the
application of the PBGC's valuation regulation outside of ERISA. See CF&I, 150 F.3d at 1301.
This conclusion is erroneous, as the CSC Industries court illustrated-29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) only
applies to subchapter I of ERISA; the PBGC's valuation regulation, dealing with unfunded benefit
liabilities is in subchapter III of ERISA. See CSC Indus., 232 F.3d at 509; see also In re US
Airways Group, Inc., 303 B.R. 784, 792 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003) (rejecting the Tenth Circuit's
interpretation of 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)).
170. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1123(a)(4) (West 2006).
171. See supranote 132 and accompanying text (explaining the components of the PBGC's
valuation regulation).
172. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 11 29(b)(2)(B)(i) (West 2006) (requiring that unsecured creditors
receive the present value of their claims).
173. See US Airways, 303 B.R. at 793-94. The treatment of the PBGC's claim in bankruptcy
is similar to the treatment of future claims of indeterminate value. The Bankruptcy Code empowers
bankruptcy courts to value all claims against the estate, including claims that are not certain as to
either liability or amount at the time of the case. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(5), 502 (West 2006). To
value these claims, the bankruptcy court estimates the amount of the future liability and then
permits the future claimants to receive the present value of that liability over the course of the
reorganization. See id. § 11 29(b)(2)(B)(i); BAIRD, supra note 8, at 90-91; David Kauffman, Note,
Proceduresfor Estimating Contingent or UnliquidatedClaims in Bankruptcy, 35 STAN. L. REV.
153, 157-58 (1982).
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barrier to the use of the PBGC's valuation regulation.' 74
B. The PBGC Valuation Regulation FurthersImportant
Policy Concerns
1. Accuracy of the Regulation
The crux of the debate over which valuation regulation to apply is
which method most accurately estimates the amount that the PBGC would
need in order to cover a plan sponsor's obligations as they become due.
The PBGC's valuation regulation enjoys a significant advantage over the
prudent investor rate as an accurate measure of the assets needed to
ultimately cover the PBGC's obligations to participants in terminated
plans. Simply stated, the prudent investor rate produces overly optimistic
assessments of long-term investment performance.' While the PBGC
does invest the assets that it recovers from terminating plan sponsors in a
mix of equity and debt,'76 the PBGC cannot seek additional assets from
plan sponsors to make up for losses sustained as a result of market
downturns or poor investment choices. 77 Accordingly, the best
measure of the PBGC's claim is what a private party would
charge in order to assume liability for a terminated plan.' 78
The valuation method encompassed by the PBGC's regulation best

174. Further, if Congress were to legislatively adopt the PBGC's valuation regulation, the
general rule against treating creditors of the same class differently would not apply because the
PBGC would enjoy a specific statutory exception to this rule.
175. See USAirways, 303 B.R. at 796 n.9 (noting that the prudent investor rate adopted by the
CF & I court-12.30/o---proved overly optimistic). The prudent investor rate only yields enough
portfolio growth if the stock market performs well. Strong stock market performance is not a given.
See BREALEY & MYERs, supra note 59, at 898-99 (discussing the increased risks associated with
investing pension funds in securities); Henry T. C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and
Government Neutrality, 78 TEx. L. REV. 777, 882-84 (2000) (criticizing the prevalent view that
investments in stocks virtually guarantee strong returns); Gary Burtless, Risk and Returns of Stock
Market Investments Held in Individual Retirement Accounts, May 11, 1999, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/burtless/19990511.htm (noting that between 1871 and
1998 "[t]he historical real stock market return averaged about 6.3%," a rate of return lower than
the prudent investor rates employed in cases discussed supraPart III.A); Joseph Morgenstern, A
Bubble or an Illusion, ISR. Bus. ARENA, May 5, 2005, availableat 2005 WLNR 7073011 (noting
that investors did not predict a series of stock market collapses culminating in the bursting of the
"dot.com" bubble in the late 1990s and accordingly pursued overly ambitious and ultimately
disastrous investment strategies); see also Patricia Chisholm, A Partyfor Gamblers, MACLEAN'S,
May 1, 2000, at 34 ("[T]here are no crystal balls when it comes to stock market performance.").
176. See US Airways, 303 B.R. at 795.
177. Seeid.
178. In the US Airways case, the PBGC presented expert testimony that the accurate measure
of"a liability is the amount a willing purchaser would charge in order to assume it." See id. at 796,
798. The US Airways court accepted this argument. Id.
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accomplishes this task.
2. PBGC Solvency
Preferring the PBGC's valuation regulation over the prudent investor
rate would also allow the PBGC a greater recovery in bankruptcy,
providing additional assets to protect the corporation from insolvency. As
the steel industry cases and the US Airways case illustrate, the PBGC's
valuation regulation dramatically increases the size of the PBGC's
unsecured claim when compared to the prudent investor rate. It is
important, however, to note that even though the PBGC may have an
extremely large unsecured claim after the application of its valuation
regulation, the amount the PBGC will actually recover in a bankruptcy is
determined by the payout percentage for general unsecured creditors.'79
Because this percentage can be quite low, granting the PBGC some form
of priority,"' ° as the PBGC and some scholars have suggested, could
hypothetically increase the PBGC's recovery.' Nevertheless, compared
to the prudent investor rate, the PBGC valuation regulation allows the
PBGC a much larger share of a plan sponsor's estate, reducing the chances
that the PBGC will have to turn to Congress for a taxpayer bailout of the
pension guaranty system.
3. Plan Confirmation
When compared to the prudent investor rate, one significant
disadvantage to the PBGC's valuation regulation is that it makes plan
confirmation less likely. Because the PBGC valuation regulation allows
a much larger claim for the PBGC, other unsecured creditors would
82
recover less than they would if the prudent investor rate were employed.1
As a result, other unsecured creditors might be less likely to vote for plan
confirmation. 8 3 If enough opposition arose, the plan sponsor would have
to fulfill the "cramdown" requirements necessary to confirm a plan over
the opposition of a class of creditors' or alternatively, convert the case to

179. See, e.g., USAirways, 303 B.R. at 791 n.6 (dismissing the argument that the PBGC would
receive a "'windfall' if its valuation regulation were applied because general unsecured creditors
under US Airways' plan were entitled to two cents on the dollar for their claims).
180. The advantages and disadvantages of conferring priority status on PBGC claims are
discussed in Part V.B.
181. See infra note 221 and accompanying text (noting that priority status may not actually
enhance the PBGC's recovery if the result is a Chapter 7 liquidation of the plan sponsor).
182. See Riley, supranote 31, at 24; supranote 56 and accompanying text (explaining the pro
rata distribution to unsecured creditors authorized under the Bankruptcy Code).
183. See supranote 70 (outlining the statutory voting majorities required to confirm a plan).
184. See supra note 8 (discussing the requirements to "cramdown" a creditor's claim).
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Chapter 7 for liquidation. 85 Plan confirmation is still possible, as the US
Airways and United Airlines cases demonstrate, 186 but the process of
securing the votes of other unsecured creditors is harder. The PBGC
valuation regulation, however, is preferable in this regard to proposals to
give the PBGC priority status, which would further dilute (or even
eliminate) the claims of other unsecured creditors. 87
C. TangentialMatters: Clarity and Consistency
The uniform adoption of the PBGC valuation regulation, accomplished
by legislative action, also promotes clarity and consistency throughout the
bankruptcy system. Presently, two circuits require the use of the prudent
investor rate. 8 8 Clearly, bankruptcy courts in the Sixth and Tenth Circuits
must apply that valuation method to the PBGC's claims. In the remaining
circuits, however, individual bankruptcy judges may make their own
decisions. As the US Airways case illustrates, this decision has enormous
consequences. 89 Allowing the forum choice of the debtor and the
assignment of a bankruptcy judge to vary the amount of an unsecured
claim by over one billion dollars flies in the face of one important goal of
the bankruptcy system-a uniform and consistent treatment of debtors and
creditors. 9 This problem is magnified by the difficulty of successfully
appealing a bankruptcy judge's decision." 1 Although incentives to forum
shop and differences among judges abound in the current system, 192 the

185. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1112(a) (West 2006) (permitting a debtor-in-possession to convert a
Chapter 11 case into a Chapter 7 liquidation). Liquidation does not comport with the underlying
policies of Chapter 11. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
186. See supra Part III.B.
187. See infraPart V.B (demonstrating the flaws in proposals to grant the PBGC priority under
the Bankruptcy Code).
188. See supra Part III.A.2-3.
189. The PBGC's claim was more than $1 billion larger under its own valuation method. See
supranotes 140-41 and accompanying text.
190. See generally U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the authority to
"establish... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States"); LYNN
M. LoPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE
BANKRUPTCY COURTS 138-39 (2005) (arguing that competition among bankruptcy courts for case
filings has created a forum shopping problem that distorts case outcomes).
191. There are both procedural and practical barriers to appealing the decisions of bankruptcy
judges. See generally BAIRD, supra note 8, at 31-32 (noting that the "time sensitive" nature of
decisions in bankruptcy renders many rulings "essentially unreviewable"); Chaim J. Fortgang &
Thomas Moers Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1061, 1107 (1985) (observing
that prolonging the bankruptcy process reduces the recovery for creditors, thus creating an incentive
to compromise); Edith H. Jones, BankruptcyAppeals, 16 T. MARSHALLL. REv. 245,252-69 (1991)
(discussing the complexity of the bankruptcy appeals process and outlining situations in which an
appeal is rendered moot).
192. See Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical
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PBGC's claim is too important to handle with such unpredictability. If the
law remains in this uncertain state, plan sponsors with underfunded
pensions may seek out fora where the PBGC's claim would be valued
under the prudent investor rate, thereby reducing the PBGC's recovery and
threatening the solvency of the PBGC.
V. ASSESSING REFORM PROPOSALS: No PERFECT SOLUTIONS EXIST
The PBGC's plight, generally and within the context of the bankruptcy
system, has garnered attention from politicians and legal commentators.
Congress adopted significant reforms in February 2006 and August 2006
to protect the solvency of the PBGC.'93 These changes are a step in the
right direction. Nevertheless, Congress has ignored the challenges the
PBGC faces when it deals with plan sponsors in bankruptcy. 94
Commentators writing in this area have focused on allowing the PBGC to
collect the full amount of its claim in bankruptcy.'95 These proposals,
however, fail to appropriately balance the complicated policy
considerations inherent in the bankruptcy system with the goal of
preserving the solvency of the PBGC. Legislative clarification of the
PBGC's status as a general unsecured creditor and codification of the
PBGC's valuation regulation for use in bankruptcy properly balances these
competing policy concerns.
A. Recent Legislative Reform
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005196 included two provisions
amending ERISA to promote the financial stability of the PBGC. 197 First,
the Act increased the required premiums that plan sponsors pay the PBGC

Analysis of Venue Choice in LargeChapter11 Reorganizations,84 CORNELL L. REv. 967,968-69
(1999) (summarizing research demonstrating significant forum shopping in large Chapter 11 cases);
M. Natasha Labovitz & Craig A. Bruens, You Can Still Shop After Winn-Dixie, 24 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 16, 61-62 (2005) (describing Winn-Dixie's creative tactics for filing its bankruptcy in New
York instead of Florida).
193. See infra Part V.A; supranote 30 and accompanying text.
194. Congress' silence in this area is somewhat analogous to earlier inaction regarding
environmental liability in bankruptcy. Though the intersection of environmental regulation and
bankruptcy law created serious problems for society and reorganizing debtors, Congress left the
task of resolving these issues to the courts. See Kathryn R. Heidt, Environmental Obligations in
Bankruptcy: A FundamentalFramework,44 FLA. L. REv. 153, 154-55 (1992). Congress's failure
to resolve the valuation of the PBGC's unsecured claim is similarly problematic.
195. See infra notes 212-13 (citing proposals to give PBGC claims priority under the
Bankruptcy Code in order to allow the PBGC a right to recover the full amount of its claim).
196. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006), codified
throughout 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461 (West 2006).
197. See id. § 8101, 120 Stat. at 180-82.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

29

FLORIDA
Florida Law Review,
Vol.LAWREVIEW
58, Iss. 5 [2006], Art. 4

[V1ol. 58

as a condition of offering DBPPs. 198 Congress indexed these increased
premium rates to inflation.' 99 Second, Congress imposed additional
premiums on plan sponsors that voluntarily terminate pension plans under
the distress termination provision of ERISA and on plan sponsors that
have pension plans involuntarily terminated by the PBGC.2 °° These
additional premiums must be paid for three years following plan
termination.2"' Plan sponsors in bankruptcy, however, are not required to
pay the additional premium until the debtor receives a discharge or
dismissal.2 2 Although it is too early to accurately gauge the effect of these
changes to ERISA, it seems likely that the increased premium payments
required of all plan sponsors will shore up the PBGC's reserves and allow
it to better absorb the impact of terminated plans.20 3 There may be negative
consequences for certain plan participants, however, as some employers
may find these additional premiums too costly, prompting the termination
of additional plans.2 "°
In addition to the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Congress recently
enacted the Pension Protection Act of 2006.205 Projections by the
198. See id. § 8101(a)(1)(A) (increasing the premium for single employer plans from $19 per
person per year to $30). The premium for multi-employer plans was increased to $8 per year for
each plan participant. See id. § 8101(a)(2)(A)(iv); see also 29 U.S.C.A. § 1306(a)(3)(A) (West
2006). For a discussion of the differences between single employer and multi-employer plans, see
supra note 36.
199. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, § 8101(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B), 120 Stat. at 180-82.
200. See id. § 8101(b). This additional premium only affects single-employer plans. See id.
The criteria controlling eligibility for distress voluntary terminations and involuntary terminations
are outlined at supra note 37. This provision applies to plans terminated after Dec. 31, 2005. See
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, § 8101(d)(1), 120 Stat. at 182.
201. See id. § 8101(b).
202. See id. The additional premium does not apply to plan sponsors who filed bankruptcy
before Oct. 18, 2005, and terminated pension plans as a part of a Chapter 11 reorganization. See
id. § 8101 (d)(1)(2)(B).
203. See H.R. REP. No. 109-232, pt. 1, at 147 (2005) (estimating that an increase in the
PBGC's premiums from $19 per participant per year to $30 would generate an additional $4.9
billion dollars for the PBGC between 2006 and 2015). As of 2005, the PBGC received
approximately $650 million annually in premiums at the $19 premium rate. See id.
204. This prediction is particularly reasonable given the inability of plan sponsors to maintain
pension plans under the status quo. See generallysupraPart II.C (discussing the current state of the
pension system). Increasing the cost of such plans may create additional incentives to freeze or
terminate plans. See Senate Hearing, supra note 11, at 12 (statement of Sen. Michael B. Enzi)
(arguing that increasing the costs associated with DBPPs may "destroy what is left of the defined
benefit pension plan system"); Senate Hearing,supranote 11, at 20 (statement of Sallie Ballantine
Bailey, Senior Vice President and Controller, the Timken Company) ("[The increased] premium
will cause operating cash flow that could be used for pension contributions, capital investments,
and R&D to be diverted to the PBGC.").
205. Pension Protection Act of2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280,120 Stat. 780 (2006). The President
signed the Pension Protection Act of 2006 on August 17, 2006. See George W. Bush, President's
Statement on H.R. 4, The "Pension Protection Act of 2006," Aug. 17, 2006, availableat 2006 WL
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Congressional Budget Office estimate that the new law will provide a
significant increase in premium revenue for the PBGC over the next
decade. 20 6 The new law may also, over the long-term, improve the funding
of pension plans in general. 2 7 The airline industry, however, is exempted
from some of the provisions of the Pension Protection Act.208 Despite this
exemption, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 may lessen the dramatic
underfunding of pension plans. 20 9 The PBGC, however, would still face
great difficulty when plan sponsors in bankruptcy terminate underfunded
pension plans.210

2375584. Portions of the Act are "identical or similar to pension provisions" in H.R. 2830, S. 1953,
and S. 1783. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R.
4, THE "PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006," AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON JULY 28,2006, AND AS

CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE ON AUGUST 3, 2006, at 2 n.2 (2006), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-38-06.pdf; see also S. 1783, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2830, 109th
Cong. (2005).
206. See Mary Williams Walsh, A Pension Overhaul Gives, and Later Takes Away, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2006, at C1.
207. See id. (discussing the Congressional Budget Office analysis). The House Report that
accompanied an earlier version ofthe law, H.R. 2830, explained that the law "includes new funding
requirements to ensure employers adequately and consistently fund their pension plans, provides
workers with meaningful disclosure about the financial status of their benefits, and protects
taxpayers from a potential multi-billion dollar bailout of the [PBGC]." H.R. REP. NO. 109-232, pt.
1, at 50 (2005). To achieve these goals, H.R. 2830 required, inter alia, plan sponsors to (1)
determine their liability under a pension plan using a Modified Yield Curve; (2) make up funding
shortfalls over a maximum of seven years; (3) stop applying credit balances from years in which
plans were over-funded if plans are funded below 80%; (4) adopt the RP-2000 Combined Mortality
Table to calculate the average life expectancy of plan participants; (5) limit benefit increases if the
plans are underfunded below 80%; and (6) restrict executive compensation arrangements if plans
are underfunded. Id. at 58-63. H.R. 2830 also required more frequent and detailed disclosures from
plan sponsors to plan participants. See id. at 69-71. H.R. 2830 was the culmination of six years of
hearings and debate. See id. at 50-57 (summarizing attempts to reform the pension system between
1999 and 2005).
208. See Walsh, supra note 206, at Cl.
209. See H.R. REP. No. 109-232, pt. 1, at 57-74 (2005) (detailing the provisions of H.R. 2830
and predicting that the proposed reforms would enhance the security of the DBPP system). But see
H.R. REP. No. 109-232, pt. 1, at 269 (2005) (Minority Views) (arguing that H.R. 2830's potential
effects have not been adequately studied); Senate Hearing,supranote 11, at 18 (prepared statement
of Ian P. MacFarlane, Director, Medley Global Advisors) (outlining the United Kingdom's
experience with transparency reforms within its pension system and arguing that adopting increased
transparency measures in the U.S. could expose the financial weakness of plan sponsors,
threatening investment and employment); Elaine L. Chao, John W. Snow, and Carlos M. Gutierrez,
Rescuing Your Retirement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at A23 (suggesting that the House and
Senate pension reform proposals fail to impose sufficiently strict funding requirements on plan
sponsors); Editorial, Pension Reform Politics,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, § 4, at 11 (arguing that
corporate special interests and Washington politics have endangered the conference bill, leaving
it "teetering on the verge of being worse than worthless").
210. See H.R. REP. No. 109-232, pt. 2, at 303-04 (2005) (Dissenting Views) (arguing that
because H.R. 2830 tightens DBPP standards plan sponsors will choose to terminate plans in

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

31

1138

FLORIDA
LAW
Florida Law Review,
Vol.
58,REVIEW
Iss. 5 [2006], Art. 4

[Vol. 58

B. PriorityUnder the Bankruptcy Code
1. Tax Priority
The Bankruptcy Code grants priority to certain unsecured tax claims.21'
The PBGC, 12 along with one student author, 213 have suggested that PBGC
claims be granted tax priority. 214 Priority tax claims are paid before general
unsecured claims 1 ' and lower priority claims.216 Administrative expenses,
some post-petition loans, certain claims for wages and benefits, and claims
by customers who have already paid for goods and services must all be
paid before priority tax claims.217 Courts have declined to afford PBGC
claims tax priority, 218 citing the language of the Bankruptcy Code219 and
congressional intent. 220 The reluctance of courts in this area reflects a

bankruptcy with greater frequency and noting that H.R. 2830 does nothing to protect pension plans
in bankruptcy).
211. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(8) (West 2006). See generally 4 COLUER ON BANKRUPTCY
507.10 (15th ed. rev. 2006) (discussing the priority status afforded certain tax claims in
bankruptcy).
212. See, e.g., In re CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 150 F.3d 1293, 1296 (10th Cir. 1998)
(summarizing the PBGC's argument in favor of tax priority); Response Brief of the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp., In re Aloha Airgroup, Inc., No. 04-03063, 2005 WL 3762223 (Bankr. Haw. Nov.
14, 2005) (arguing that PBGC claims are entitled to tax priority under the language of I.R.C.
§ 412(n)).
213. See Uylaki, supra note 15, at I10-11 (arguing that the tax lien to which the PBGC is
entitled outside of bankruptcy justifies granting tax priority to PBGC claims in bankruptcy).
214. See II U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(8)(C) (West 2006) (granting "eighth" priority to claims for
unpaid "tax[es] required to be collected or withheld and for which the debtor is liable in whatever
capacity").
215. See In re Federal's Inc., 553 F.2d 509,518(6th Cir. 1977) (explaining that priority claims
are paid before general unsecured claims).
216. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(9)-(I 0) (West 2006) (prioritizing below tax claims those claims
"based upon any commitment by the debtor to a Federal depository institutions regulatory agency
(or predecessor to such agency) to maintain the capital of an insured depository institution" and
personal injury claims arising out of "the operation of a motor vehicle or vessel" while intoxicated).
217. See id. § 507(a)(1)-(7). Other priority claims precede tax claims. See id.These claims,
however, are unlikely to be relevant in Chapter I1cases involving business reorganizations. See
id.(prioritizing, inter alia, alimony and child support claims, as well as claims of farmers and
fisherfolk for their goods ahead of tax claims).
218. See, e.g., In re CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 150 F.3d 1293, 1298 (10th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the PBGC is not entitled to tax priority status because "there is simply no credible
argument that the required payments fund either a function of the United States or any of its
undertakings"); In re Kent Plastics Corp., 183 B.R. 841, 846 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1995) (holding that
the PBGC's claim was not a tax claim); In re Chateaugay Corp., 130 B.R. 690, 697 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, opinion withdrawn 1993 WL 388809 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1993) (same).
219. See, e.g., CF& I, 150 F.3d at 1297.
220. See id.; see also James W. Giddens, Attempting to ProtectEmployee Retirement Income
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central concern of the Chapter 11 system: Granting priority status to too
many claimants would prevent debtors from reorganizing successfully
because priority claims must either be paid in full at confirmation or the
" ' Even though tax claims may
claimant must agree to deferred payment.22
222
be paid over a longer period, giving tax priority to the PBGC would
create enormous priority claims that could ultimately doom confirmation
of most reorganization plans.223 Forcing debtors into liquidation would not
serve the interests of the PBGC,224 other claimants against the debtor's
estate, or employees (whose welfare matters greatly within the bankruptcy
system).225
2. Administrative Priority
The PBGC has also argued that its pension claims should be afforded
administrative priority under the Bankruptcy Code.226 Claims classed as
administrative expenses of an estate receive priority above all other claims
in a typical Chapter 11 bankruptcy.227 Administrative expenses include,

within Bankruptcy Reorganization: PBGC Efforts to Obtain Priority Status, 12 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 397, 404-13 (1993) (summarizing the PBGC's arguments for tax priority and
concluding that the text of 11 U.S.C. § 507, as well as congressional intent, indicate that the PBGC
is not entitled to tax priority for its claims in bankruptcy).
221. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(9) (West 2006). Unfunded pension liability claims can be quite
large, thus jeopardizing reorganization if such claims must be paid in full. See, e.g., In re US
Airways Group, Inc., 303 B.R. 784, 787-88 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003) (stating that the PBGC's value
of the claim was approximately $2 billion and the calculation resulted in a $900 million claim); see
also Giddens, supra note 220, at 428 (concluding that affording the PBGC priority status would
undermine reorganization in many cases); Brannick, supra note 31, at 1613-14 (arguing that such
priority status would preclude most confirmations). Professor Keating suggests another problem
associated with giving the PBGC priority in bankruptcy: "forum shopping." See Daniel Keating,
Pension Insurance,Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 65, 92-94. Essentially,
giving priority to the PBGC would give some creditors an incentive to help corporations stay out
of bankruptcy, while simultaneously giving the PBGC an added incentive to push corporations into
bankruptcy. See id.
222. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(9)(C)(ii) (allowing payment oftax priority claims over a fiveyear period).
223. See supranote 221 and accompanying text.
224. But see Keating, supra note 221, at 92-94 (stating that PBGC would have an incentive
to encourage bankruptcy).
225. See supranotes 3-8 (outlining the policy concerns favoring reorganization).
226. See, e.g., CF & I, 150 F.3d at 1298. Student authors have also argued that the PBGC's
claim should receive administrative priority. See Lassiter, supra note 77, at 953-54 (calling the
author's proposal to give the PBGC priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507 "super-priority"); Christine
Stinson Matott, Note, Airlines in Distress:Can the PensionBenefit GuarantyCorporationWeather
the Crisis?,55 DEPAUL L. REv. 169, 199-200 (2005).
227. See I1 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(2) (West 2006). Technically, payments for "domestic support
obligations" have priority over most administrative expenses, but this provision is not relevant to
the Chapter II reorganizations contemplated in this Note. See id.§ 507(a)(1).
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inter alia,a trustee's fees if a trustee is appointed to operate the estate, the
fees of certain professionals (lawyers and accountants), expenses incurred
while operating the business in bankruptcy, and certain taxes and fines
incurred by the estate.228 Relying on a case interpreting the old Bankruptcy
Act, the PBGC argued in CF & I that its claim arose when the debtor
terminated its plan post-petition, creating a statutory obligation to pay the
PBGC the amount its plan was underfunded.229 The CF & I court rejected
this argument, concluding that the missed minimum contributions were
pre-petition debts.23 The court also noted that Congress explicitly granted
priority status to retiree medical benefits due during the course of
bankruptcy proceedings and thus could have also given priority status to
pension claims if it so desired.2 3' Beyond the legal problems with the
PBGC's argument,232 the same practical concern plaguing the tax
priority proposal also applies to the application of administrative
prioritym-giving such potentially enormous claims priority would
hinder efforts to reorganize. 33 With administrative priority, this
concern is amplified because administrative claims receive higher
priority than tax claims. 234 Giving the PBGC the advantageous position
of an administrative priority claim might allow it to recover more in

228. See id. § 503(b).
229. See CF & I, 150 F.3d at 1298-99. The PBGC argued that the reasoning in Reading Co.
v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968), lent support to its claim for administrative priority. See CF& I, 150
F.3d at 1298. The issue in Reading was whether negligence by a receiver created a cost entitled to
administrative priority. 391 U.S. at 476. The bankruptcy referee (the rough equivalent to a
bankruptcy judge under the old Bankruptcy Act), the district court, and the court of appeals held
that such tort liability did not give rise to an administrative claim. Id. at 474-75. The Supreme Court
reversed, id. at 475, holding "that damages resulting from the negligence of a receiver acting within
the scope of his authority as receiver gave rise to 'actual and necessary costs' of a Chapter XI
arrangement." Id. at 485. The Court noted in support of its holding that state and federal taxes due
after entering receivership were treated as "actual and necessary costs" of operating the entity in
receivership. Id. at 484.
230. CF&I, 150 F.3dat 1299-1300.
231. Id. at 1300.
232. The Tenth Circuit distinguished the PBGC's claim as contractual (as opposed to
statutory) because it arose out of the relationship between employers and employees. Id. at 1299.
Because the obligation to make funding contributions is a debt that an employer incurs pre-petition
and owes as contributions become due (and the PBGC is only given the role of enforcing this
obligation), the PBGC's claim must be treated as a pre-petition rather than post-petition claim. See
id.
233. See Brannick, supra note 31, at 1613-14; supra note 221 and accompanying text
(explaining the difficulty of confirming a reorganization plan when large priority claims exist).
234. Administrative expenses are second priority claims (although de facto, they are first
priority claims in most Chapter 11 business reorganization cases, see supra note 226), while tax
claims are eighth priority claims. Cf 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(2), (8) (West 2006). Additionally,
because administrative expenses afforded priority must be paid in full with cash at confirmation,
see id. § 1129(a)(9)(A), granting this form of priority to the PBGC's claims would prove an even
greater obstacle to plan confirmation.
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some cases, but in most instances the reorganized debtor would
probably be forced into liquidation, reducing every creditor's recovery.
3. "Super-Priority"
Professor Keating has suggested that the PBGC be afforded priority
status above and beyond administrative or tax priority-"superpriority." 2" Under Professor Keating's approach, the PBGC would have
the authority to ask federal or bankruptcy courts to prohibit the transfer of
a plan sponsor's assets to any other creditor or party until the PBGC's
claim is paid in full.2 36 Armed with this form of "super-priority," the
PBGC's claim would enjoy status superior even to secured creditors
because secured creditors would not be entitled to collect against their
collateral until the PBGC received full payment of its claim.2" One
advantage to this approach is that it encourages creditors to carefully
investigate whether a plan sponsor is meeting its funding obligations
outside of bankruptcy.23 In other words, because creditors would have a
vested interest in pension plans being fully funded, they would perform
due diligence to make sure that plan sponsors meet their obligations.239 In
theory, plan sponsors would more consistently fund their plans in order to
have access to credit."l As a practical matter, however, "super-priority"
would create disastrous situations once a plan sponsor files bankruptcy. In
addition to the problem of creating a claim so large that reorganization
becomes impossible,241 this proposal would make it virtually impossible
for reorganizing plan sponsors to secure post-petition financing (so-called
debtor-in-possession or "DIP loans"). 242 Professor Keating's proposal has
235. See Keating, supra note 221, at 100-01. The "super-priority" proposed by Professor
Keating is more expansive than the forms of "super-priority" allowed under the Bankruptcy Code
for post-petition lenders and creditors whose adequate protection fails because it restricts the sale
of assets even outside of bankruptcy and trumps the claims of secured creditors. Id.at 100; cf.11
U.S.C.A. §§ 364(c)(1), 507(b) (West 2006) (providing "super-priority" for certain claims under the
current Code). A more accurate description of Professor Keating's proposal would be "ultimate
priority."
236. Keating, supranote 221, at 100.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See supranotes 221,232-33 and accompanying text (discussing the perils of prioritizing
PBGC claims above other creditors' claims).
242. See Brannick, supranote 31, at 1615-16. Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes
the trustee (or debtor-in-possession) to obtain credit to facilitate the operation and reorganization
of the bankrupt entity. 11 U.S.C.A. § 364. Creditors who extend new credit may be entitled to
higher administrative priority than other creditors with administrative priority claims. Id.§ 364(c).
In Chapter 11 cases, this post-petition financing is commonly referred to as "DIP financing" or
"DIP lending." See George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession
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also been criticized because it would give the PBGC the power to veto the
243
transfer of assets or the acceptance or rejection of executory contracts.
Enhancing the PBGC's position in bankruptcy is an important and
laudable goal, but this proposal simply goes too far by complicating the
reorganization process to the point of absurdity.
C. Securing the PBGC's Claim with a FloatingLien
One student author, Nicholas Brannick, has suggested giving the PBGC
a "floating lien" that arises each year in an amount equal to the missed
contributions of a plan sponsor.2 " Under this proposal, each year the
PBGC would evaluate the assets in a pension plan and apply "actuarial
assumptions" to estimate the required assets needed to meet the
obligations under the plan.245 Then, "using actuarial assumptions that
account for the rate of return on plan assets realized by similarly situated
employers" in the plan sponsor's industry, the PBGC would determine if
a plan was adequately funded. 2 ' To the extent that the plan is
underfunded, the PBGC would be given a lien at the end of the tax year in
the amount of the funding deficit. 247 The principal advantage of this
proposal is that the PBGC
would have a security interest to protect its
248
bankruptcy.
claim in
There are several serious problems, however, with Brannick's floating
lien. First, it would almost certainly drive remaining sponsors of DBPPs
away from offering such plans, accelerating the present trend toward

Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901,901-02 (1993) (summarizing the mechanics of"DIP financing").
If the PBGC could block the sale of any assets of the reorganizing debtor until its claim was paid
in full, then potential lenders would find DIP loans much less attractive because their priority would
be less than that of the PBGC, with its enormous claim. See Brannick, supra note 31, at 1615-16.
Without the additional capital that DIP loans provide, it is unlikely that a Chapter 11 reorganization
would succeed. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, DEBTORS & CREDITORS, supra note 24, at 459-60
(explaining post-petition financing).
243. Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee or debtor-in-possession to accept
or reject executory contracts (contracts that have not been fully performed). 11 U.S.C.A. § 365
(West 2006). Because executory contracts are property of the estate, Professor Keating's proposal
would require the PBGC's approval before such contracts could be accepted or rejected. See
Brannick, supra note 31, at 1617. As a result, estates could lose value as potentially profitable
assignments of executory contracts are delayed by the PBGC.
244. See Brannick, supra note 31, at 1621-24. Brannick borrows the "floating lien" concept
from Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Brannick, supranote 31, at 1622 n.284 (citing
U.C.C. § 9-204(a) (2001)). U.C.C. § 9-204(a) allows security agreements to attach to after-acquired
property, hence the designation "floating lien." For a discussion of the inclusion of after-acquired
property in a security interest, see 79 C.J.S. Secured Transactions§ 86 (2006).
245. Brannick, supra note 31, at 1621-22.
246. Id.at 1621.
247. Id. at 1621-22.
248. Id. at 1627.
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defined contribution plans.249 Second, in bankruptcy, the PBGC would
have a large secured claim that could hinder efforts to reorganize the
entity. 250 Third, the floating lien would significantly complicate attempts
by plan sponsors to secure credit both inside and outside of bankruptcy
because potential lenders would be wary of making loans to an entity
whose assets are already pledged to satisfy a large, government-held
claim.2 1' Finally, the imposition of floating liens could generate long and
costly litigation between the PBGC and plan sponsors over not only the
necessity of attaching a lien, but also over the discount rate and actuarial
assumptions employed to fix the amount of the lien. 2
D. Another Solution: LegislativeAdoption of the PBGC's
Valuation Regulation
Although determining the amount of an allowed claim is traditionally
left to the good discretion of bankruptcy judges,253 there should be clear
legislative direction for valuing unsecured claims held by the PBGC. As
part of the 2005 Amendments,254 Congress provided specific guidance to
bankruptcy courts for determining the replacement value of property
subject to secured claims in the context of individual Chapter 7 and

249. Given the present trend toward eliminating DBPPs, see supra note 72, and the risk that
more employers will join this trend under the higher premium rates recently adopted by Congress,
see supra note 204, creating a "floating" security interest in favor of the PBGC could push
remaining plan sponsors over the edge. Brannick argues, however, that a "floating lien" without
higher premiums would motivate employers to fully fund their plans. Brannick, supranote 31, at
1623.
250. Just as likely, however, the PBGC could be left with an unsecured claim if the value of
the assets held by the bankrupt entity are less than the total amount of all secured claims. A
creditor's secured claim is only secured up to the value of the collateral securing the claim. See 11
U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 2006). Any deficiency becomes an unsecured claim. See id.
251. Inside bankruptcy, the absence of unencumbered assets could complicate securing DIP
loans. See supra note 242. Outside of bankruptcy, potential lenders could be wary of extending
financing to corporations whose assets are subject to a PBGC floating lien that is already perfected.
See generally BREALEY & MYERS, supranote 59, at 895-96 (suggesting that banks should look to
unfunded pension liability of borrowers when making lending decisions).
252. The possibilities for litigation under this proposal are virtually endless. For example, plan
sponsors could challenge the PBGC's valuation and actuarial assumptions used to compute the
amount of the lien. Litigation along this line is particularly likely given the present legal action over
the valuation of the PBGC's claims in bankruptcy. See supra Part III. Encouraging complex
litigation in this area does nothing to strengthen the viability of the pension system or the PBGC
itself.
253. See supranote 57 and accompanying text.
254. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23 (2006) (codified throughout 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1532 (West 2005)); see also supra
note 24 (citing authorities describing the impact of the amendments).
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Chapter 13 bankruptcies."' Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code
to include similar language dealing with claims brought by the PBGC,
which would invoke the PBGC's valuation methodology both in and out
of bankruptcy.256
Unlike proposals to afford the PBGC the status of a secured creditor or
priority unsecured creditor, this solution would avoid creating PBGC
claims that would obstruct plan confirmation because the PBGC's claim
would be treated as a general unsecured claim.25 Legislative adoption of
the PBGC's valuation method, however, would significantly increase the
size of the PBGC's unsecured claim, potentially enhancing the overall
fiscal viability of the corporation.5 In conjunction with structural reforms
aimed toward improving the funding practices and accountability of plan
sponsors prior to termination,25 9 the PBGC's valuation regulation best
addresses the policy justifications for reorganization while simultaneously
strengthening the solvency of the PBGC.
VI. CONCLUSION

Underfunded pension plans drive some corporations into bankruptcy;
other corporations exploit the Bankruptcy Code to jettison their pension
plans. Proposed solutions to this problem focus on the PBGC's position
outside of bankruptcy, but ignore the difficulties that the PBGC encounters
once plan sponsors seek bankruptcy protection.2 This neglect threatens
the future of the pension guaranty system. If plan sponsors continue to
manipulate the intersection between the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA to
avoid paying the PBGC the full amount of their unfunded pension liability,
255. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(a)(2).
256. Congress could add a new subsection to I1 U.S.C. § 502 that provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, a claim brought by the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation for unfunded pension liability shall be valued
according to the regulations promulgated by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation for valuing such claims outside of bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court
shall apply the regulations in effect as of the date that the debtor files its petition
pursuant to this title. Any claims brought by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation pursuant to this section shall be classified as general unsecured
claims.
257. Cf supraParts V.B-C.
258. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text (outlining the dramatic improvement of
the PBGC's position flowing from the use of its valuation regulation).
259. See supra Parts II.C & V.A. Even if present and future reforms fail to address the
structural problems the pension guaranty system currently faces, facilitating greater recoveries by
the PBGC is worthwhile. See supraParts IV.B-C.
260. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; supra Part V.A (discussing the inadequacies
of reform proposals).
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then the PBGC may default on its guaranties to present and future retirees.
A default by the PBGC would either deprive Americans of promised
benefits or require a costly taxpayer bailout of the system. Neither
alternative is acceptable. Consequently, action must be taken to strengthen
the PBGC's status in bankruptcy court.
When a bankruptcy court decides how much the PBGC may recover
under a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, it faces difficult choices between
complicated legal and policy considerations. Although there are other
possible solutions to this quandary,26' Congress should provide a uniform
standard for valuing the PBGC's claim so that the PBGC may consistently
recover enough assets from reorganized corporations to satisfy its
obligations to plan beneficiaries. Until then, bankruptcy courts should
262
favor the PBGC's valuation regulation over the prudent investor rate.
The PBGC valuation regulation strikes the best balance between the
competing policy objectives and is superior to the prudent investor rate
often advocated by reorganizing debtors and other unsecured creditors. If
Congress fails to act, then each new bankruptcy that makes headline news
threatens the retirement security of Americans and pushes the American
people one step closer to an expensive government bailout of the PBGC.

261. See generally supra Part V (discussing alternative solutions for ensuring the future
solvency of the PBGC). Part V of this Note by no means provides an exhaustive list of potential
solutions. For example, the United Auto Workers union suggests allowing the PBGC to restructure
the timetable over which a reorganizing plan sponsor may fund its pension obligations, instead of
simply requiring the PBGC to terminate underfunded plans. See Senate Hearing,supranote 11, at
43 (statement ofAlan Reuther, Legislative Director, UAW). Mr. Reuther stressed that this approach
could potentially allow reorganized debtors to eventually return their plans to solvency, obviating
the need for a PBGC takeover of the plan. Id.; see also House Hearing,supra note 15, at 22
(prepared statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States) (arguing that
the PBGC should be given broader regulatory control over plan sponsors, similar to the powers that
the FDIC possesses in relation to the banks that it insures).
262. The trend may already be moving in this direction. Following the US Airways case, the
bankruptcy court in the United Airlines bankruptcy also employed the PBGC valuation regulation.
See supra note 136 (discussing the ruling from the bench adopting the PBGC valuation regulation
in the United Airlines case). Additionally, in In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., the district court
approved the bankruptcy court's decision to accept a settlement between the debtor and the PBGC
that valued the PBGC's claim for unfunded pension liability using the PBGC's valuation method.
339 B.R. 91, 96 (D. Del. 2006). The district court noted a split of authority between the older
circuit-level decisions employing the prudent investor rate and the more recent adoption of the
PBGC's valuation regulation in the US Airways case. Id.
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